Continuation funds in India: structure, valuation and LP consent

A continuation fund lets a private equity manager keep holding an asset it believes still has upside, while giving the fund’s existing investors a choice: cash out now at an agreed valuation, or roll their stake into a new vehicle that continues to own the same asset on a fresh timeline. This is not a theoretical structure in India. Domestic fund managers have already used it to move sizeable, high-performing single-asset stakes out of ageing funds and into purpose-built vehicles, delivering strong multiples to exiting investors while letting the manager keep the asset under management through a later listing or exit. India now ranks second among emerging markets for GP-led secondary deal volume, and several dedicated continuation vehicles are already active or in the pipeline. This article sets out how the structure actually works under Indian law: the SEBI consent thresholds, the diversification cap that pushes single-asset deals offshore, the CCI treatment that has cleared transactions of this kind, and the tax position across a domestic AIF versus a GIFT IFSC structure.

What is a continuation fund, and how big is this market in India already?

A continuation fund, more precisely called a continuation vehicle (CV) in market usage, is not a term defined anywhere in the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) (Alternative Investment Funds) Regulations, 2012 (AIF Regulations). It describes a transaction structure, not a regulatory category: a fund manager transfers one or more portfolio assets out of an ageing fund and into a new vehicle it also manages, financed by a mix of rolling existing investors and fresh secondary capital.

The scale behind this is no longer small. India’s private equity sector is working through a genuine liquidity problem: exits declined roughly 19% in deal count and 18% in value in calendar year 2025 against 2024, even as the global secondary market hit a record USD 240 billion in transaction volume, up 48% year on year. Against that backdrop, India now accounts for 21% of completed continuation vehicles by number among emerging markets between 2020 and the first half of 2025, ranking second in the category. A short but growing list of dedicated vehicles is already active in the market, spanning both single-asset and multi-asset structures.

How does a GP-led continuation vehicle differ from an ordinary secondary sale?

Two structurally different transactions both get loosely called secondaries, and the distinction determines which SEBI provisions apply.

LP-led secondary sale. An individual limited partner (LP) sells its existing commitment in a fund to a new investor, before the fund’s scheduled maturity. The buyer simply steps into the selling LP’s position, assuming its remaining capital commitments and future distributions. The manager typically has to consent to the transfer, but the fund itself does not change: no assets move, no new vehicle is created.

GP-led continuation vehicle. Here the manager, not an individual LP, initiates the transaction. One or more portfolio assets are transferred out of the ageing fund (the “legacy fund” or “selling fund”) into a newly created vehicle under the same manager’s control. The purchase is funded by a combination of fresh secondary investors and existing legacy fund LPs who elect to roll their interest forward instead of cashing out. Because the manager sits on both sides of this trade, as fiduciary to the selling fund and as promoter of the buying vehicle, this is the structure that draws SEBI’s related-party scrutiny and the market’s conflict-of-interest concerns.

Continuation vehicles generally take one of two forms. A single-asset CV holds one portfolio company, typically the manager’s single best-performing holding nearing an exit event such as a listing. A multi-asset CV bundles several holdings together into one vehicle, letting a manager retain a small basket of trophy assets rather than isolating just one.

What does a continuation vehicle transaction actually look like, step by step?

The mechanics are easiest to follow through a worked illustration. Take a Category II AIF in its ninth year, holding a large minority stake in a market-leading, near-monopoly business acquired several years earlier, with a listing expected in the next 18 to 24 months. Selling the stake immediately would close the fund out on schedule but forfeit the pre-listing value gain, while some of the fund’s investors want liquidity now rather than an indefinite extended hold.

The resolution typically follows four steps. First, the manager registers a new AIF or scheme, built specifically to hold the asset in question. Second, that new vehicle acquires the stake from the ageing fund at a price benchmarked to net asset value (NAV). Third, existing investors in the ageing fund are offered a choice: take a proportionate cash payout from the sale proceeds, or roll their interest into the new vehicle at the same valuation. Fourth, fresh secondary investors commit new capital alongside the rolling investors, funding the payout to those cashing out and providing follow-on capital for the vehicle going forward.

A transaction structured this way tends to price close to NAV, with little to no discount, only where the underlying asset carries an unusually strong profile, near-monopoly market position, robust financials, and a credible near-term listing or exit narrative that lets secondary buyers underwrite the deal with confidence. That asset-quality premium does not transfer automatically to every continuation vehicle; more typical Indian secondary transactions still price at a 20% to 25% discount to book NAV, and a manager pitching a continuation vehicle for a less exceptional asset should expect LPs and secondary buyers to price that discount in.

What SEBI regulations actually constrain a continuation vehicle transfer?

Three provisions of the AIF Regulations do the real work here, and a manager who only checks one of them will miss a structural constraint.

No dedicated registration track. SEBI has not created a specific licence category for continuation vehicles. A CV must be constituted either as an entirely new AIF, requiring a fresh registration, or as a new scheme under an existing AIF, which still requires its own minimum corpus, its own private placement memorandum (PPM), and segregated bank accounts and assets. Registering a new AIF from scratch typically takes a couple of months, and that lag collides directly with a legacy fund’s own tenure deadline if the continuation vehicle process starts late.

Regulation 15(1)(c): the 25% single-investee cap. Category I and II AIFs cannot invest more than 25% of investable funds in a single investee company, whether directly or through units of another AIF, with large value funds for accredited investors permitted up to 50%. This cap sits awkwardly against single-asset CVs, which by design concentrate the entire vehicle in one company. For a mainland Indian AIF, this is a genuine structural constraint on how large a single-asset continuation vehicle can be relative to its own corpus, and it is one of the reasons managers structuring large single-asset deals look toward GIFT IFSC, where the diversification norms differ.

Regulation 15(1)(ea): the 75% related-party consent, with a conflicted-voter carve-out. Because a continuation vehicle is almost always managed or sponsored by the same manager or an affiliate of the selling fund, the asset transfer is a related-party transaction requiring approval from at least 75% of investors by value of their investment. SEBI adds a governance safeguard on top of the threshold itself: any investor holding 50% or more of the selling fund’s corpus who is also a buyer in the continuation vehicle must be excluded from the vote. This exclusion exists specifically to stop a large anchor investor who benefits on both sides of the trade from voting the deal through.

Does a continuation vehicle transaction need Competition Commission clearance?

Because a continuation vehicle transfer moves shares in an investee company from one entity to another, even where both entities sit under the same sponsor group, it can technically trip the Competition Commission of India’s (CCI) merger control thresholds. This is not a hypothetical concern. In 2025, the CCI considered exactly this question for a continuation vehicle transaction where a fund manager’s affiliated legacy vehicles proposed transferring their shareholdings in portfolio companies to a newly formed continuation vehicle within the same sponsor group, as the underlying funds approached the end of their term.

The CCI held that this kind of internal restructuring through a continuation vehicle qualifies for exemption under Rule 3 of the Competition (Criteria of Exemption of Combinations) Rules, 2024, provided the transaction involves no change in ultimate control and no acquisition of new rights. This order effectively carves out a safe harbour for GP-led continuation vehicle transfers within the same sponsor group, but the exemption is conditional on control genuinely staying put; a continuation vehicle structured in a way that shifts effective control, for instance by bringing in a secondary investor with veto or governance rights over the new vehicle that the legacy fund’s LPs never had, would need to be assessed against the exemption criteria fresh rather than assumed to qualify automatically.

How is the transferred portfolio valued, and why does the manager’s dual role matter?

Valuation is the single most contested element of any continuation vehicle transaction, because the same manager who originally priced the asset into the legacy fund is now, in effect, setting both the exit price for departing investors and the entry price for the new vehicle’s investors.

SEBI’s valuation framework requires AIF investments to be valued at fair value using standardised methodologies, and that requirement extends to the NAV at which a continuation vehicle acquires assets from the selling fund. What SEBI does not require, unlike the approach the US Securities and Exchange Commission has proposed for adviser-led secondaries, is a mandatory independent fairness opinion specifically commissioned for the continuation vehicle transfer. In practice, the fund’s existing registered valuer report often does double duty as the basis for both the fund’s regular NAV reporting and the continuation vehicle pricing, which is a meaningfully lower bar than a transaction-specific fairness opinion. Sophisticated managers increasingly convene an independent LP advisory committee (LPAC) review, and in larger deals engage an independent process adviser, typically an investment bank, as a market-standard substitute for a formal regulatory requirement that does not yet exist in India.

There is a second layer of pricing discipline where a foreign investor sits on either side of the trade. Under the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019, a resident Indian entity cannot sell to a non-resident below the FEMA-determined fair value, and a non-resident cannot sell to a resident above it, the so-called floor-ceiling mechanism. If a continuation vehicle transaction is priced at a discount to book NAV to reflect illiquidity, that discount has to be tested against the FEMA-recognised fair value, not the stale book value, and a mismatch between the two can create a pricing compliance problem independent of whether the AIF-level valuation requirement was satisfied.

India also lacks the kind of secondary market pricing benchmarking infrastructure that exists globally through providers tracking secondary transaction pricing surveys, which makes it harder for an individual LP, particularly a smaller family office or HNI investor without in-house deal evaluation capability, to independently judge whether an offered NAV genuinely reflects market pricing rather than the manager’s own preferred outcome.

What LP consent applies, and how does it differ across the wind-down lifecycle?

Consent thresholds are not uniform across the options available to a fund approaching the end of its term, and the differences matter for how a manager sequences the process.

Decision	Threshold	Regulatory basis
Extend the existing scheme’s tenure	Two-thirds of unit holders by value	Regulation 13(5)
Extend tenure of a large value fund or AI-only scheme	Two-thirds of unit holders by value, up to 5 years	Regulation 13(5) proviso
Transfer assets to a continuation vehicle managed by an associate	75% of investors by value, with any 50%+ conflicted investor excluded from the vote	Regulation 15(1)(ea)
Enter a dissolution period for unliquidated investments at tenure end	75% of investors by value	Regulation 29(9A), SEBI circular dated 26/04/2024
Realign an LVF’s extension period post-August 2024 amendment	Consent of all investors	SEBI circular dated 19/08/2024

This table reflects the thresholds in force at the time of writing, and it is worth flagging that SEBI has a live proposal on the table to change it. A consultation paper dated 30 June 2026 proposes replacing the varying two-thirds and 75% thresholds across the AIF Regulations with a single uniform 75% approval requirement, and separately proposes broadening the narrow “associate” concept used in Regulation 15(1)(ea) to a wider “related party” definition modelled on Section 2(76) of the Companies Act, 2013, covering relatives, common directors, and entities under common control that the current associate test may not catch. Public comments are open until 21 July 2026, and SEBI has indicated any new framework would apply prospectively rather than disrupting existing schemes’ consent methodology. Neither proposal is in force yet, but a manager structuring a continuation vehicle transfer now should assume the related-party definition it relies on today for determining who counts as conflicted may be interpreted more broadly by the time the transaction closes.

A manager weighing a continuation vehicle against a straightforward tenure extension should note that the two solve different problems. Extension under Regulation 13(5) keeps the same legal fund, the same LPs, and the same fund documents in force for up to two more years; it buys time but gives no LP an exit. A continuation vehicle transfer under Regulation 15(1)(ea) requires a materially higher consent bar, but it is the only one of the two that actually delivers a liquidity choice to LPs who want out now.

What happens if the fund’s term runs out and no continuation vehicle has been arranged?

Where a manager has not lined up a continuation vehicle buyer and the fund’s tenure, including any extension, has genuinely expired, SEBI’s fallback mechanism takes over. The scheme enters a one-year liquidation period under Regulation 29, during which the manager must sell remaining holdings and distribute proceeds. If assets remain unsold as that period runs out, Regulation 29(9A) allows entry into a dissolution period, subject to 75% investor consent by value. Before seeking that consent, the manager should arrange a bid for at least 25% of the unliquidated investments’ value and obtain valuations from two independent valuers, disclosed to investors ahead of the vote. Arranging the bid is not, strictly, a precondition to getting consent: if the manager cannot secure a qualifying bid, the fund can still enter the dissolution period on 75% consent, but the unliquidated investments are then marked at a nominal ₹1 for track record and performance benchmarking purposes rather than at any intrinsic or indicative value, a lasting hit to the manager’s reported performance history. No management fee can be charged on the fund during the dissolution period itself.

If the requisite 75% consent for the dissolution period is not obtained at all, SEBI does not leave the fund in limbo: the unliquidated investments must be mandatorily distributed in-specie to investors without further consent, valued at the same nominal ₹1 for benchmarking purposes. Any investor who refuses to accept an in-specie distribution has that specific investment written off entirely rather than converted to cash. The same mandatory in-specie outcome applies if the dissolution period itself ends without a completed sale, and no further extension or additional liquidation period is available after that point. This bid-and-consent architecture replaced the earlier liquidation scheme mechanism for any scheme entering liquidation on or after 25 April 2024; older liquidation schemes already launched continue to be governed by Regulation 29A until wound up.

The practical takeaway is that the dissolution period is a safety net, not a substitute for planning a continuation vehicle early. It gets a fund out of an unliquidated position, but through a bid-and-distribution process rather than the kind of rolling-investor, fresh-capital structure that lets investors choose between cashing out and staying invested through to a later listing or exit.

One further development is worth flagging for a fund that has completed a continuation vehicle transfer or a dissolution-period distribution but still cannot achieve a nil bank balance, typically because a tax reassessment or a pending litigation on the transaction has left a residual liability outstanding. SEBI introduced a new Regulation 29(10A) and an “Inoperative Fund” status through a winding-up circular effective 16 June 2026, letting such a scheme retain proceeds beyond its permissible fund life, invested in liquid instruments under Regulation 15(1)(f), for up to three years for residual operational expenses, or without that time cap where the retention is tied to a genuine tax or litigation demand. A fund tagged as inoperative cannot launch new schemes or charge management fees, but it is exempt from much of the routine compliance burden that applies to an active fund, and can only surrender its registration once the underlying liability is resolved and all retained proceeds are distributed.

How does the tax position differ between a domestic continuation vehicle and a GIFT IFSC structure?

Tax treatment is often the deciding factor in whether a manager routes a continuation vehicle onshore or through Gujarat International Finance Tec-City (GIFT City).

For a domestic Category I or II AIF, the pass-through regime under Section 224 of the Income-tax Act, 2025 (ITA 2025), the successor to Section 115UB of the erstwhile Income-tax Act, 1961, means capital gains on the underlying portfolio assets are deemed to accrue directly to investors rather than being taxed at the fund level. A transfer of assets from the legacy fund to a domestic continuation vehicle is not covered by any specific exemption, so gains crystallise as a taxable event both at the point rolling LPs exchange their units and, depending on the asset’s character, potentially at the fund level for business income.

A GIFT IFSC-domiciled continuation vehicle is treated very differently. Transfers of interest from an existing foreign fund into a GIFT IFSC resultant fund are not treated as taxable transfers for capital gains purposes, under an exemption whose sunset has been extended to 31 March 2030, and this tax-neutral treatment extends to both the fund-level asset transfer and the unit exchange for rolling investors. Cost base and holding period also carry over fully: a rolling investor’s cost of acquisition and holding period in the new GIFT IFSC vehicle is deemed to include the period the asset or interest was held in the original fund, which matters directly for whether a subsequent exit qualifies for long-term capital gains treatment.

This tax-neutrality advantage is one reason large continuation vehicles are increasingly structured in GIFT IFSC rather than onshore. But GIFT IFSC domiciliation is not tax-neutral for FEMA purposes in every direction. A GIFT IFSC vehicle is treated as a person resident outside India, so a transfer of assets from a mainland Indian fund into it is an outbound transfer attracting FEMA overseas investment compliance, while a transfer the other way, from a GIFT IFSC fund into a mainland vehicle, is treated as inbound foreign investment attracting FDI and downstream investment rules. Where the offshore fund and the GIFT IFSC vehicle are related parties, the transfer price must also satisfy arm’s length principles under the transfer pricing provisions of the Income Tax Act, since the IFSC vehicle remains a tax resident of India regardless of its FEMA characterisation.

For rolling investors specifically, capital gains on unlisted securities and AIF units held over 24 months are taxed at 12.5% without indexation benefit under the current long-term capital gains regime, a rate that applies uniformly whether the units sit in a domestic AIF or, absent the GIFT IFSC exemption, a foreign fund structure. From assessment year 2026-27, securities held by Category I and II AIFs are statutorily classified as capital assets, which removes a long-running source of litigation risk around whether AIF gains should instead be characterised as business income.

Common mistakes that cost managers time and money

Starting the AIF registration process too late. A continuation vehicle needs its own AIF registration or scheme approval, which takes a couple of months even when uncontested. Managers who wait until a legacy fund’s final year to start this process routinely run out of runway and end up forced into the dissolution period fallback instead of the continuation vehicle they actually wanted.

Assuming a single-asset CV can be sized freely within a mainland AIF. The 25% diversification cap under Regulation 15(1)(c) constrains how large a single asset can sit inside a Category I or II AIF’s corpus. Managers planning a large single-asset continuation vehicle for a mainland structure often discover this constraint only after modelling the deal size, at which point GIFT IFSC domiciliation becomes the practical workaround rather than a preference.

Missing the conflicted-voter exclusion under Regulation 15(1)(ea). Where a large anchor investor in the legacy fund is also planning to invest in the continuation vehicle, that investor must be excluded from the 75% consent vote if it holds 50% or more of the legacy fund’s corpus. Managers who count that investor’s vote in the tally risk the entire consent process being challenged later.

Treating the existing valuer report as sufficient without an LPAC review. SEBI does not mandate a transaction-specific fairness opinion, but relying solely on the fund’s routine registered valuer report, without an independent advisory committee review or process adviser, leaves a manager with no defensible answer if a dissenting LP later challenges the pricing.

Overlooking CCI exposure on intra-group transfers. Even where a continuation vehicle transfer stays entirely within the same sponsor group, it can technically trip merger control thresholds. A 2025 CCI exemption order provides a template for structuring the transfer to qualify under Rule 3 of the Competition (Criteria of Exemption of Combinations) Rules, 2024, but only where control genuinely does not change; assuming the exemption applies without checking the specific facts is a live risk.

Case Study

Situation: A Category II venture fund based in Bengaluru, in its ninth year, was holding a single high-conviction fintech asset with an expected IPO 18 months out, alongside two smaller unexited positions.

Challenge: The manager wanted to retain exposure to the fintech asset through its IPO, but a third of the fund’s LPs by value, including one anchor investor holding over 50% of the corpus, wanted a clean exit rather than an extended hold.

What Treelife did: Structured a single-asset continuation vehicle as a new AIF scheme, ran the Regulation 15(1)(ea) consent process with the anchor investor correctly excluded from the vote given its intention to roll into the new vehicle, and coordinated an LPAC review of the independent valuation ahead of the investor disclosure.

Outcome: 81% of investors by value consented to the transfer, cashing-out LPs were paid against the independent valuation, and the fund avoided both a forced sale of the fintech asset and a dissolution period that would have left the two smaller positions distributed in-specie.

FAQ’s on Continuation Funds in India

Q: Is a continuation fund legal under Indian AIF regulations?
A: There is no dedicated “continuation fund” category under the SEBI (Alternative Investment Funds) Regulations, 2012, but the structure is achievable by registering a new AIF or scheme to acquire assets from the existing fund under Regulation 15(1)(ea), subject to the diversification cap under Regulation 15(1)(c) and the 75% investor consent requirement.

Q: What is the difference between a single-asset and a multi-asset continuation vehicle?
A: A single-asset continuation vehicle holds one portfolio company, typically the manager’s single best-performing holding nearing a listing or exit, while a multi-asset vehicle bundles several holdings together; the choice affects both the diversification cap analysis and how easily new secondary investors can underwrite the deal.

Q: How much does structuring a continuation vehicle typically cost?
A: Costs scale with whether the vehicle is registered as a new AIF or a new scheme, the number of assets involved, and the complexity of the related-party consent and valuation process; advisory fee structures are usually quoted once the deal size and number of legacy fund LPs is known.

Q: What is the realistic timeline for setting up a continuation vehicle?
A: Registering a new AIF typically takes a couple of months even when uncontested, and the investor consent process on top of that needs adequate time for LPAC review and disclosure, so managers should start the process at least six to nine months before the legacy fund’s tenure is due to expire.

Q: What tax treatment applies to LPs who roll their interest into a continuation vehicle?
A: For a domestic continuation vehicle, the unit exchange is generally a taxable event for rolling investors, whereas a GIFT IFSC-domiciled vehicle benefits from tax-neutral treatment on the transfer, with the rolling investor’s cost of acquisition and holding period carried forward from the original fund.

Q: Does a continuation vehicle transfer need Competition Commission of India approval?
A: It can technically trip merger control thresholds even for an intra-group restructuring, but a 2025 CCI order confirmed that transfers of this kind can qualify for exemption under Rule 3 of the Competition (Criteria of Exemption of Combinations) Rules, 2024, provided there is no change in control and no acquisition of new rights.

Q: Why do large single-asset continuation vehicles often get structured in GIFT IFSC instead of onshore?
A: The 25% single-investee diversification cap under Regulation 15(1)(c) constrains how large a single asset can sit within a mainland Category I or II AIF’s corpus, and GIFT IFSC’s Fund Management Regulations offer more structural flexibility for concentrated single-asset vehicles alongside the tax-neutral transfer treatment.

Q: What happens to an LP who does not consent to the continuation vehicle transfer?
A: A dissenting LP is generally entitled to a cash exit reflecting the agreed valuation rather than being forced to roll into the new vehicle, though the exact mechanics for a pro-rata cash exit should be set out clearly in the fund’s disclosure documentation before the consent vote, not assumed.

Q: Is an independent fairness opinion mandatory for a continuation vehicle transaction in India?
A: No. Unlike the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s proposed rules for adviser-led secondaries, SEBI does not mandate a transaction-specific fairness opinion; the market standard that has emerged instead is an independent LP advisory committee review, and for larger deals an independent process adviser, typically an investment bank.

Q: What happens if a manager cannot arrange the 25% bid before seeking dissolution period consent?
A: The fund can still enter the dissolution period on 75% investor consent by value without the bid in hand, but the unliquidated investments are then marked at a nominal ₹1 for track record and performance benchmarking purposes rather than at their intrinsic value, which is a lasting mark against the manager’s reported performance history, so arranging the bid first is strongly preferable even though it is not an absolute precondition.

Q: What if a legacy fund’s continuation vehicle transfer leaves a residual tax dispute that prevents full wind-up?
A: SEBI’s Inoperative Fund framework, introduced with effect from 16 June 2026, lets a fund retain proceeds tied to a genuine tax demand or litigation beyond its permissible fund life, invested in liquid instruments, while surrendering active-fund compliance obligations, and it can only formally surrender its registration once the dispute is resolved and remaining proceeds are distributed.

Q: What stamp duty applies to a continuation vehicle transfer?
A: Transfer of unlisted demat shares or AIF units typically attracts stamp duty of 0.015% on consideration, while assignment of an LP interest in a trust-form AIF can attract meaningfully higher, state-specific stamp duty, for example ranging up to 3% in Maharashtra, so state-level analysis is essential before finalising the transaction structure.

Q: Can a foreign investor participate in an Indian continuation vehicle?
A: Yes, subject to FEMA’s floor-ceiling pricing mechanism under the Non-Debt Instruments Rules, which requires the transaction price to respect the FEMA-determined fair value depending on whether the resident or non-resident party is buying or selling, and subject to Press Note 3 scrutiny if the vehicle’s beneficial ownership traces back to an investor in a land border sharing country.

Regulatory references

• Regulation 13(4), 13(5), 13(6), SEBI (Alternative Investment Funds) Regulations, 2012
• Regulation 15(1)(c), 15(1)(ea), SEBI (Alternative Investment Funds) Regulations, 2012
• Regulation 29, 29(9), 29(9A), 29(10A), SEBI (Alternative Investment Funds) Regulations, 2012
• SEBI (Alternative Investment Funds) (Second Amendment) Regulations, 2024, notified 25 April 2024
• SEBI Master Circular for Alternative Investment Funds dated 3 June 2026 (updated 16 June 2026 to add Chapter 25 on winding up and Inoperative Fund status), superseding the Master Circular dated 7 May 2024 and consolidating the dissolution period framework originally issued as Circular No. SEBI/HO/AFD/PoD-I/P/CIR/2024/026 dated 26 April 2024
• SEBI Consultation Paper dated 30 June 2026 on rationalising investor consent thresholds and the “related party” definition under the AIF Regulations (pending; comments open until 21 July 2026)
• Rule 3, Competition (Criteria of Exemption of Combinations) Rules, 2024
• Section 224, 229, Income-tax Act, 2025 (erstwhile Section 115UB, Income-tax Act, 1961)
• Section 70(1)(t) and 70(1)(u), Income-tax Act, 2025 (erstwhile Section 47(viiac) and 47(viiad), Income-tax Act, 1961)
• Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019

External sources

• SEBI: Master Circular for Alternative Investment Funds
• SEBI: Data relating to activities of Alternative Investment Funds
• Income Tax India