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India’s fast changing consumer landscape is best represented by the disruption caused by the quick commerce (“QCom”) sector. QCom has risen rapidly in the country post the Covid-19 pandemic, led by brands like BlinkIt, Swiggy Instamart and Zepto. Consequently, these QCom companies have seen rapid growth and success since 2020, attracting investors witnessing a slowdown in major sectors like fintech and online education. This shift has rattled established players and has created sizable challenges for traditional Kirana and mom-and-pop stores in the country. 

The rising pressure came to a head in August 2024, when the All India Consumer Products Distributors Federation (AICPDF) wrote to the Commerce and Industry Minister, Piyush Goyal, urging government security of quick commerce platform, citing threats to small retailers and potential FDI violations¹. Seeking an immediate investigation into the operational models of these QCom platforms, the AICPDF urged implementation of protective measures for traditional distributors. With the release of a white paper by the Confederation of All India Traders (CAIT) alleging unfair trade practices and potential violation of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) policy by QCom players, immediate regulatory intervention has been urged, leading to speculation on the continued growth of these QCom platforms². 

In these Treelife Insights pieces, we break down how QComs like Blinkit and Swiggy Instamart work, the impact of this sector on traditional distributors, the issues raised by AICPDF and CAIT and what the future for QCom could hold. 

How does Quick Commerce work?

Fundamentally, QCom is an innovative retail model that emphasizes speed and convenience in delivery of goods, designed to meet consumers’ immediate needs. The process chart below showcases how the QCom model operates: 

However, QCom is limited in its ability to replicate value focused items available in traditional stores or larger retailers, such as staples (with higher price sensitivity) or open stock keeping units, or personalized khata systems for customers³.  

Impact of QCom on Traditional Distributors

The rapid expansion of QCom taps into the consumer’s need for instant gratification in the Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG) sector. Leveraging significant funding, advanced technology, and a network of dark stores, these platforms expanded from metros to Tier-2 cities, offering essentials within 10–15 minutes, and eliminating the need to approach traditional mom-and-pop shops or kirana stores to purchase their daily needs. 

• Loss of Business for Traditional Distributors: Given the consumer preference for convenience, wide product range and speedy delivery, there is a decline in foot traffic for traditional stores. Further, AICPDF in its August 2024 letter cited a shift in the FMCG distribution landscape itself, with QCom platforms being increasingly appointed as director distributors by major FMCG companies, sidelining traditional distributors⁴.
  

• Pricing Competition: When backed by heavy investment, QCom platforms are able to offer deep discounts on the products, which make it difficult for traditional distributors to compete.
  
• Inventory Turnover: Given the lack of sales, these traditional stores are sitting on high levels of inventory which results in delayed payments to distributors. This is impacted further by the fact that traditional stores cater to the impulse purchase vertical of consumers, who are now turning to QCom⁵.
  
• Technology Gap: QCom fundamentally employs advanced technology to analyze trends, manage inventory and logistics, and boost customer retention. Traditional stores are unable to invest in such infrastructural developments.  

Legal Background 

Further to its August 2024 letter, AICPDF filed a complaint with the Department of Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT) in September 2024, which was forwarded to the Competition Commission of India (CCI)⁶. AICPDF then formally complained to the CCI in October 2024⁷ following which, CAIT released a white paper calling for a probe into the top 3 QCom players in the country⁸ for possible violations of the FDI Policy and the Competition Act, 2002⁹.   ¹⁰

Background of FDI Policy as applicable to e-commerce sector

Alleged Violations of the FDI Policy

• Misuse of FDI Funds: The white paper states that the top 3 QCom platforms have collectively received over INR 54,000 crore in FDI, with only a minimal portion allocated to infrastructure development. Instead, a substantial amount is purportedly used to subsidize operational losses and fund deep discounts, which CAIT argues is a deviation from the intended use of FDI for asset creation and long-term growth.
  
• Inventory Control via Preferred Sellers: The white paper states that QCom platforms operate dark stores through a network of preferred sellers, effectively controlling inventory. This practice is seen as a circumvention of FDI regulations that prohibit foreign-backed marketplaces from holding inventory or influencing pricing directly. 

Alleged Violations of the Competition Act

• Predatory Pricing and Market Distortion: Through the deep discounts (funded by FDI) offered by these QCom players, CAIT alleges undermining of traditional retailers and distortion of fair market competition. Such practices are viewed as detrimental to the survival of small businesses, including the estimated 30 million kirana stores in India.
  
• Restricted Market Access: The white paper highlights that exclusive agreements with a select group of sellers limit market access for other vendors, thereby reducing competition and consumer choice. This strategy is alleged to create an uneven playing field, favoring certain sellers and marginalizing others. 

Concluding Thoughts

CAIT’s white paper calls for immediate regulatory intervention to address these issues, emphasizing the need to protect the interests of small traders and maintain a fair competitive environment in India’s retail sector. However, formal updates in the regulatory space are still pending, any regulatory intervention would likely arise from the potential contravention of the FDI policy. The fundamental issue of whether or not the QCom model operates as an inventory-based e-commerce model will need to be determined to assess whether or not there has been a violation of the FDI Policy. As such, any regulatory intervention will have a sizeable impact on the market, and the Central Government has yet to formally respond to the CAIT and AICPDF calls for intervention.

FAQs on Quick Commerce in India

1. What is Quick Commerce (QCom)?
   QCom refers to an innovative retail model that delivers goods to consumers within a short time frame, often 10–15 minutes, leveraging hyperlocal supply chains, advanced logistics, and micro-fulfillment centers (dark stores).
2. What impact does QCom have on traditional Kirana stores and distributors?
   QCom has disrupted traditional retail by reducing foot traffic to Kirana stores, introducing aggressive pricing competition, and capturing consumer preference for speed and convenience. This shift has led to inventory turnover challenges, delayed payments, and reduced profitability for traditional distributors.
3. What are the key legal concerns raised against QCom platforms?
   Key concerns include:
   • Misuse of FDI funds for operational losses and deep discounts instead of infrastructure development.
   • Predatory pricing practices that distort market competition.
   • Restricted market access through exclusive agreements with select sellers.
   • Alleged circumvention of FDI regulations by controlling inventory via preferred sellers.
4. What is the role of AICPDF and CAIT in addressing these concerns?
   The All India Consumer Products Distributors Federation (AICPDF) and the Confederation of All India Traders (CAIT) have highlighted the challenges posed by QCom platforms. They have filed complaints and published a white paper, urging regulatory intervention to protect traditional retailers and ensure compliance with FDI and competition laws.
5. How does the QCom model differ from traditional retail?
   QCom focuses on hyperlocal supply chains, real-time inventory management, and last-mile delivery using advanced technology, whereas traditional retail relies on physical storefronts, human-driven processes, and personalized consumer relationships like credit-based “khata” systems.

1. [1] https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/cons-products/fmcg/quick-commerce-fmcg-distributors-raise-red-flags-seek-scrutiny-over-rapid-expansion-of-platforms-like-blinkit-zepto-instamart-fdi-rule-violations/articleshow/112763093.cms?from=mdr
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2. [2] https://www.lokmattimes.com/business/cait-releases-white-paper-with-allegations-of-unfair-trade-practices-against-quick-commerce-companies/
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3. [3] https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/startup/is-quick-commerce-eating-into-kiranas-or-e-commerce-blinkit-swiggy-zepto-dmart-delhivery-weigh-in-12795319.html
   ↩︎
4. [4] https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/cons-products/fmcg/quick-commerce-fmcg-distributors-raise-red-flags-seek-scrutiny-over-rapid-expansion-of-platforms-like-blinkit-zepto-instamart-fdi-rule-violations/articleshow/112763093.cms?from=mdr
   ↩︎
5. [5] https://retail.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/e-commerce/e-tailing/kirana-stores-hit-hard-as-quick-commerce-surges-distributors-struggle-to-recover-dues-report/114461769#:~:text=Traditional%20Kirana%20stores%20in%20India,millions%20of%20small%20business%20owners. 
   ↩︎
6. [6] https://www.cnbctv18.com/business/quick-commerce-companies-violate-fdi-norms-aicpdf-19480198.htm
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7. [7] https://www.cnbctv18.com/business/quick-commerce-companies-violate-fdi-norms-aicpdf-19480198.htm
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8. [8]  Including Blinkit, Zepto and Swiggy Instamart.
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9. [9] https://www.deccanherald.com/business/quick-commerce-platforms-using-fdi-to-fund-deep-discounts-cait-3275356
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10. [10] Guidelines on cash and carry wholesale trading to apply ↩︎

Introduction

One of the most discussed media and entertainment industry developments since early 2023 is the merger of the media assets of Reliance Industries’ (“RIL”; including JioCinema) with Disney India’s (“Disney”; including Disney+Hotstar)¹. The deal has continued to make headlines, with the latest being a series of developments in an enterprising case of ‘cybersquatting’ on the “JioHotstar.com” domain². In this #TreelifeInsights piece, we break down the core legal issues surrounding this JioHotstar dispute: what cybersquatting is, why it is considered an infringement of intellectual property rights, and what the legal ramifications of the developer’s actions are.  

Timeline

1. 2022 – Disney loses digital streaming rights for Indian Premier League to RIL’s Viacom18. Disney sees loss of subscriber revenue.
2. February 2024 – Disney and Viacom18 sign contracts; Viacom18 and Star India to be integrated into a JV reportedly valued at INR 70,352 crores (post money).
3. August 2024 – Competition Commission of India and NCLT approve the USD 8.5 billion merger.
4. October 2024 – Anonymous Delhi-based app developer reveals registration of “Jiohotstar.com” domain name; offers to sell to RIL in exchange for higher education funding. RIL responds threatening legal action. 
5. October 26, 2024 – Reports emerge that domain name has been sold to a UAE-based sibling duo involved in social work.
6. November 11, 2024 – UAE siblings reveal their refusal of sale of domain name; offers to legally transfer to RIL for free.

Legal Backdrop: Intellectual Property Rights

In order to better understand the implications of this ‘cybersquatting’, it is critical to recognise the intellectual property rights (‘IPR’) in question:

• Intellectual Property Rights (‘IPR’): legal right of ownership over the creation, invention, design, etc. of intangible property resulting from human creativity. A critical element to the protection of IPR is restraining other persons from using the protected material without the prior permission of the owner.
• Trademarks: a form of intellectual property referring to names, signs, or words that are a distinctive identifier for a particular brand in the market, protected in Indian law by Trade Marks Act 1999. 
• Domain names included in IPR: in today’s digital world, a web address that helps customers easily find the business/organization online – a domain – is also considered a brand that should be registered as a trademark to prevent misuse.
• Value: trademarks are a great marketing tool that make the brand recognizable to the consumers, and directly correlates to an increase in the financial resources of the business. 
• Consequences: breach of IPR can lead to monetary loss, reputational damage, operational disruptions or even loss of market access for a business. Infringement therefore attracts significant criminal and civil liability, as a means to dissuade unauthorized use and protect such IPR owners.

In this regard, the positions adopted by RIL and the developer are briefly set out below: 

What is Cybersquatting?

‘Cybersquatting’ or digital squatting refers to the action of individuals who register domain names closely resembling established brands, often with the intent to sell for profit or otherwise leverage for personal gain. Cybersquatting can take the following forms:

• Typo squatting/URL hijacking: Domains are purchased with a typographical error in the name of a well-known brand, with the intent to divert the target audience when they misspell a domain name. This could occur with an error as simple as “gooogle.com” instead of “google.com”.
• Identity Theft: Existing brand’s website is copied with the intent to confuse the target consumer. 
• Name Jacking: Impersonation of a celebrity/famous public figure on the internet (includes creating fake websites/accounts on social media claiming to be such public figure). 
• ‘Reverse’ Cybersquatting: False claim of ownership over a trademark/domain name and accusing the domain owner of cybersquatting. 

Cybersquatting can be used as a form of extortion, an attempt to take over business from a rival, or even to mislead/scam consumers, but there is no law in India that specifically addresses such acts of cybersquatting. Since domains are considered ‘trademarks’ under the law, use of a similar or identical domain would render an individual liable for trademark infringement³, in addition to any other liabilities that may be applicable from the perspective of consumer protection laws.   

Legal Treatment of Cybersquatting

Cybersquatting rose as an issue as more and more businesses began to realize the value of their online presence in the market. As the digital age unfolded, the Internet Corporation of Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) was founded in 1998 as a non-profit corporation based out of the United States with global participation. In 1999, the ICANN adopted the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) to set out parameters in which top level domain disputes are resolved through arbitration. It is important to note that the remedies available under UDRP are only cancellation or transfer of the disputed domain name and do not envisage monetary compensation for any loss suffered. This was ratified in India through the .IN Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (INDRP) which is available to all domains registered with .in or .bharat.

Procedure under ICANN/UDRP

1. File a Complaint: Approach a provider organization like the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre (ADNDRC), or the Arab Center for Dispute Resolution (ACDR). Complaints must demonstrate certain key elements.
2. Submissions: The respondent is notified of the complaint and UDRP proceedings initiated. Respondents are given 20 days to submit a response to the complaint defending their actions.
3. Ruling: A panel with 1 or 3 members is appointed to review the submissions and evaluate the complaint. The panel renders a decision within 14 days of the response submission deadline.
4. Implementation and Judicial Recourse: 10 day period is given to the losing party to seek judicial relief in the competent courts. The Registrar of ICANN will implement the panel’s decision on expiry of this period. Either party can seek to challenge the decision in a court of competent relief. The panel’s decision remains binding until overturned by a court order. 

Key Elements to a Successful Complaint of Cybersquatting

• Identical or Confusingly Similar Domain Name: The disputed domain name should be identical or confusingly similar to an established trademark or service mark to which the complainant has legal right of ownership;
• Lack of Legitimate Interest: The registrant of the domain name (i.e., the alleged squatter) should have no legitimate interest or right in the domain name; and 
• Bad Faith: The disputed domain name should be registered and being used in bad faith. 

Factors influencing the UNDRP Panel Review

• Disrupt Competitors: Intent of registrant was to disrupt the business of a competitor; 
• Sale/Transfer to Owner: Intent is to resell, transfer, rent or otherwise give right of use to the owner of the trademark; 
• Disrupt Reflection of Trademark: Intent is to disrupt the owner from reflecting their trademark in a corresponding domain name and whether a pattern of such conduct is observed by the domain name owner;
• Commercial Gain through Confusion: Intent is to attract internet users to the registrant’s website for commercial gain by capitalizing on the likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s trademark.

Remedies under Indian Law

As held by the Honorable Supreme Court of India, disputes on domain names are legally protected to the extent possible under the laws relating to passing off even if the operation of the Indian Trade Marks Act, 1999 is not extraterritorial (i.e., capable of application abroad). Thus, complainants of cybersquatting can pursue the standard reliefs available under the Trade Mark Act, 1999:

• Remedy for Infringement: Available only when the trademark is registered; 
• Remedy for Passing Off: Available even without registration of the trademark.

Notable Examples of Cybersquatting in India

With the evolution of the digital age, India has seen some notable judicial precedents that have shaped how cybersquatting is legally addressed:

The JioHotstar Case

The registration of the domain name “JioHotstar” by the unnamed developer amounts to a textbook case of cybersquatting, for which relief can be pursued by RIL and/or Star Television Productions Limited (respectively, the registered owners of “Jio” and “Hotstar” trademarks), either under Trade Marks Act, 1999 or through ICANN/UDRP, relying on the following factors: 

• Confusing Similarity: The domain name is confusingly similar to the registered trademarks owned by RIL and Star respectively. Though the formal transfer of trademark has not happened, RIL can still rely solely on the Jio trademark to claim similarity of the mark⁹. A joint application can also be filed by RIL and Star, as this domain registration would amount to infringement of two separate registered marks; 
• Lack of Legitimate Interest: The message posted by the developer on the domain webpage makes it clear that there is no legitimate interest in the domain name to be held by the developer. There is no common reference in public to him by the brand name “JioHotstar” and his clear intent to sell the name for profit evidences a lack of legitimate interest; 
• Bad Faith Registration: The transparent intent of the developer to sell the name to profit from the merger and fund his education (i.e., personal gain) evidences a bad faith registration. This is further bolstered by his statement recalling the rebranding of music platform Saavn to ‘JioSaavn’ post the acquisition by RIL’s Jio, which motivated the application for and registration of the domain name¹⁰. Bad faith is also recognised within the UDRP itself, when the purpose of the domain name registration is to gain valuable consideration in excess of documented out of pocket costs related directly to the domain name¹¹.

Conclusion

Given the intent behind such domain registrations arousing JioHotstar controversy, cybersquatting typically targets established, reputed brands. In fact, the domain name “JioSaavn.com” was itself the subject of a domain name  dispute for cybersquatting in 2018¹². Though the merger had swiftly navigated regulatory challenges including conditional approval from the Competition Commission of India and clearances from the National Company Law Tribunal and the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, the domain registration in an unrelated third party’s name serves to showcase the impact that issues such as cybersquatting can have on large scale mergers and acquisitions. The “noble” intent of the developer to use this registration to fund his education aside, the intent is still to leverage the registration for personal gain, thereby satisfying the conditions under law to establish bad faith registration and consequently, cybersquatting that amounts to an infringement of IPR. Interestingly, the domain registration has seemingly been transferred and the webpage now reflects the social service mission of two children in the UAE¹³. Given the now cross border nature of the dispute and the fact that Trade Marks Act, 1999 cannot be applied extraterritorially, the recourse available to RIL and/or Star to gain ownership of this domain would now be through the UDRP and prescribed dispute resolution mechanisms thereunder. However, in light of latest reports that the UAE siblings have offered to legally transfer the registration to RIL for free, it remains to be seen how this dispute will unfold.

NOTE: 

Recently, the domain “Jiostar.com” went live with a teaser message, “coming soon,” sparking speculation that it could be the official platform for Reliance Industries’ streaming services following the Reliance-Disney merger. While there is no official confirmation, many believe this new domain may replace or supplement “JioHotstar.com” in the wake of the cybersquatting issue.

FAQs on the JioHotstar Cybersquatting Case

1. What is cybersquatting?
Cybersquatting, also known as domain squatting, is the act of registering, selling, or using a domain name with the intent of profiting from the trademark of another person or business. Typically, cybersquatters aim to sell the domain to the rightful trademark owner or use it to redirect traffic for personal gain.

2. What does cybersquatting mean in the context of domain names?
In domain name cybersquatting, individuals register domains that closely resemble well-known brands, trademarks, or business names. This practice is intended to leverage the established brand’s reputation, either for financial gain or to redirect web traffic.

3. Are there examples of cybersquatting in India?
Yes, cybersquatting cases in India include notable legal battles such as Yahoo! v. Akash Arora, where the defendant registered the domain “YahooIndia.com,” and Bisleri v. Mr. Pramod Borse, involving the domain “Bisleri.com.” The recent JioHotstar domain row is another example, highlighting cybersquatting practices and legal implications.

4. What happened in the JioHotstar domain case?
An anonymous app developer registered “JioHotstar.com” shortly after news of the Reliance-Disney merger. The developer initially intended to sell the domain to Reliance Industries to fund his education, which led to claims of cybersquatting and trademark infringement.

5. Why is the JioHotstar domain considered a case of cybersquatting?
The JioHotstar domain is deemed cybersquatting because it combines two well-known trademarks, “Jio” and “Hotstar,” for potential personal gain, evidenced by the developer’s offer to sell the domain to Reliance. This action reflects typical cybersquatting behavior under both Indian law and international dispute resolution standards.

6. How does Indian law address cybersquatting?
Although India lacks specific cybersquatting laws, such cases can be pursued under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The Act offers remedies for trademark infringement and passing off, both of which can apply in cybersquatting disputes.

7. What legal recourse is available for cybersquatting cases in India?
Victims of cybersquatting can file a complaint under the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) through ICANN or under the .IN Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (INDRP) if the domain is registered with .in. In addition, they may pursue action under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, for trademark infringement or passing off.

8. Why is the JioHotstar domain case significant?
The JioHotstar domain row is a high-profile example of cybersquatting involving established brands. This case underscores the importance of protecting trademarks in India, particularly in the context of large mergers and acquisitions, as well as the challenges of cross-border cybersquatting disputes.

9. What are the steps to resolve a cybersquatting dispute under the UDRP?
To resolve a cybersquatting case, a complainant files a complaint with an organization like WIPO. The process includes notifying the domain owner, reviewing submissions, and having a panel render a decision. Remedies include transferring or canceling the domain but not monetary compensation.

10. How did the JioHotstar domain row end?
Initially, the domain was offered for sale by the developer, but later it was transferred to two UAE-based siblings. Given the now cross border nature of the dispute and the fact that Trade Marks Act, 1999 cannot be applied extraterritorially, the recourse available to RIL and/or Star to gain ownership of this domain would now be through the UDRP and prescribed dispute resolution mechanisms thereunder. However, in light of latest reports that the UAE siblings have offered to legally transfer the registration to RIL for free, it remains to be seen how this dispute will unfold.

References:

1. [1] https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/media/entertainment/media/reliance-disney-media-giant-may-be-born-in-november/articleshow/114477261.cms?from=mdr
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2. [2] https://www.business-standard.com/companies/news/delhi-techie-snags-jiohotstar-domain-asks-reliance-to-fund-cambridge-dream-124102400446_1.html
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3. [3] Under Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
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4. [4] 1999 ALR 620
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5. [5] 2001 SCC OnLine Del 444
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6. [6] WIPO Case No. D2005 0271
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7. [7] C.S. No. 335 of 2020
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8. [8] IA (Lodging) No. 38837 of 2022 in IA (Lodging) no. 26556 of 2022 in Commercial IP Suit (Lodging) No. 26549 of 2022
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9. [9] This argument has been successfully put forth by Decathlon SAS in previous UDRP case, where the domain name “decathlon-nike.com” was ordered to be transferred to Decathlon trademark owner despite a lack of consent from Nike, as there was no provision in the policy or rules requiring a third party consent [Decathlon SAS v Nadia Michalski Case No. D2014-1996, available here: https://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/search/text.jsp?case=D2014-1996].
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10. [10] https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/new-updates/cant-stand-against-reliance-app-maker-who-demanded-rs-1-crore-for-jiohotstar-com-domain-name-seeks-legal-help/articleshow/114543044.cms?from=mdr
    ↩︎
11.  [11] Paragraph 4(b)(i) of the UDRP (accessible here: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/policy-2024-02-21-en)
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12.  [12] WIPO Case No. D2018-1481 
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13. [13] https://www.hindustantimes.com/entertainment/web-series/techies-message-asking-reliance-1-crore-for-jiohotstar-domain-mysteriously-vanishes-uae-siblings-now-own-the-website-101729919899425.html
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Treelife Fintech Report 2024-25

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India’s Fintech Report 2024-25 by Treelife provides a data-driven analysis of the fintech industry in India, highlighting key trends, growth drivers, and future opportunities. As the fintech market size in India continues to expand rapidly, this report offers a comprehensive view of how fintech companies and fintech startups in India are transforming the financial landscape.

A major highlight of the India Fintech Report 2024-25 is the transformative role of India Stack in shaping the fintech ecosystem. India Stack, a government-backed digital infrastructure, provides a suite of open APIs that enable seamless integration between private companies and government services, paving the way for digital financial inclusion on an unprecedented scale.

India Stack’s Four Layers

1. Identity (Aadhaar): A unique digital identity for over 1.3 billion Indians, facilitating secure, real-time identity verification. Aadhaar has been instrumental in enabling digital onboarding, reducing costs, and expanding access to financial services.
2. Payments (UPI, AEPS): The Unified Payments Interface (UPI) and Aadhaar-enabled Payment System (AEPS) provide a secure, real-time digital payments system, transforming digital payments in India and making it accessible to both urban and rural populations.
3. Paperless (DigiLocker): Digital management of documents through DigiLocker allows users to store, manage, and share official documents securely, supporting financial transactions and government interactions without physical paperwork.
4. Data (DEPA): The Data Empowerment and Protection Architecture (DEPA) framework empowers individuals to securely share personal and financial data with their consent, enabling innovative fintech services and fostering data privacy.

India Stack has been a game-changer for fintech companies in India, democratizing access to banking, insurance, lending, and wealth management services. It has supported the rapid expansion of fintech startups in India by reducing barriers to entry, lowering costs, and enabling interoperability across financial services.

Impact of India Stack on Fintech in India

The implementation of India Stack has not only increased the fintech market size in India but also boosted financial inclusion, particularly in rural areas where traditional banking access is limited. By facilitating over 63 billion Aadhaar authentications and enabling UPI to process billions of transactions annually, India Stack has become the backbone of India’s digital economy.

Key Insights from the Report

1. Market Growth: The fintech sector in India is projected to reach a valuation of $420 billion by 2029, with a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 31%. This growth is driven by digital innovations, increased internet penetration, and supportive regulatory frameworks. India has emerged as one of the top three fintech ecosystems globally, with over 3,000 fintech startups contributing to this growth.
2. Digital Payments in India: Digital payment systems in India have witnessed exponential growth, largely powered by the Unified Payments Interface (UPI) and RuPay cards. In FY 2023-24 alone, UPI processed over 131 billion transactions, representing more than 80% of retail digital payments. The UPI market size is expected to increase significantly as UPI expands globally, positioning India as a leader in digital payments.
3. Opportunities at GIFT IFSC: GIFT IFSC (Gujarat International Finance Tec-City) has become a key strategic location for fintech growth, offering a gateway to global markets. The report highlights the benefits for fintech firms establishing operations in IFSC GIFT City, including tax incentives and access to international markets. With over 55 fintech entities already operational in GIFT IFSC, it is fast becoming a preferred destination for new fintech startups in India.
4. Investment and Funding Trends: The fintech market in India has attracted significant investment, with total funding peaking at $9.6 billion in 2021. Although funding levels normalized to $6 billion in 2022 and $2.7 billion in 2023, the report indicates that investor interest remains high, particularly in areas like digital lending, payments, and insurance technology.
5. Fintech Job Market: The expansion of the fintech ecosystem has also spurred job creation. Fintech jobs in India are on the rise, with demand for talent in areas such as digital payments, data analytics, AI, and cybersecurity. This surge in job opportunities underscores the sector’s potential for sustained growth and innovation.
6. Public Market Performance and Leading Companies: The Report 2024-25 also examines the public market performance of key fintech companies in India and compares it with traditional financial institutions. The report discusses how fintech companies, such as Paytm and Angel One, have navigated the challenges of going public, highlighting trends in valuation and market perception. While new-age fintech firms are driving innovation and growth, they face scrutiny around profitability and sustainability, which can impact stock performance in the public market.
7. Top Companies in India’s Fintech Ecosystem: The report sheds light on leading players in the fintech sector in India, including Razorpay, PhonePe, Zerodha, and Cred, which are shaping the landscape across segments like digital payments, lending, and wealth management. These companies exemplify the rapid growth and transformative impact of fintech on India’s economy.
8. Investment Landscape and Major Investors: The investment landscape in India’s fintech market has attracted some of the biggest names in venture capital and private equity. Key investors, including Blume Ventures, Accel, Matrix Partners India, and Kalaari Capital, have played a vital role in funding the growth of fintech in India. In 2021, fintech funding peaked at $9.6 billion, and though it moderated to $6 billion in 2022, investor interest remains high, particularly in sectors like digital payments and LendingTech.

Types of Fintech Covered in the Report

The Treelife India Fintech Report 2024-25 covers a wide array of fintech segments that are driving innovation across the financial landscape in India:

• Digital Payments (PayTech): Exploring the growth of UPI and mobile wallets, which now dominate the digital payments system in India.
• LendingTech: Covering advancements in digital lending, Buy Now Pay Later (BNPL) models, and platforms providing seamless credit access to individuals and businesses.
• InsurTech: Examining technology-driven innovations in the insurance sector, including digital policy management and AI-powered risk assessments.
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Introduction

One of the most discussed media and entertainment industry developments since early 2023 is the merger of the media assets of Reliance Industries’ (“RIL”; including JioCinema) with Disney India’s (“Disney”; including Disney+Hotstar)¹. The deal has continued to make headlines, with the latest being a series of developments in an enterprising case of ‘cybersquatting’ on the “JioHotstar.com” domain². In this #TreelifeInsights piece, we break down the core legal issues surrounding this JioHotstar dispute: what cybersquatting is, why it is considered an infringement of intellectual property rights, and what the legal ramifications of the developer’s actions are.  

Timeline

1. 2022 – Disney loses digital streaming rights for Indian Premier League to RIL’s Viacom18. Disney sees loss of subscriber revenue.
2. February 2024 – Disney and Viacom18 sign contracts; Viacom18 and Star India to be integrated into a JV reportedly valued at INR 70,352 crores (post money).
3. August 2024 – Competition Commission of India and NCLT approve the USD 8.5 billion merger.
4. October 2024 – Anonymous Delhi-based app developer reveals registration of “Jiohotstar.com” domain name; offers to sell to RIL in exchange for higher education funding. RIL responds threatening legal action. 
5. October 26, 2024 – Reports emerge that domain name has been sold to a UAE-based sibling duo involved in social work.
6. November 11, 2024 – UAE siblings reveal their refusal of sale of domain name; offers to legally transfer to RIL for free.

Legal Backdrop: Intellectual Property Rights

In order to better understand the implications of this ‘cybersquatting’, it is critical to recognise the intellectual property rights (‘IPR’) in question:

• Intellectual Property Rights (‘IPR’): legal right of ownership over the creation, invention, design, etc. of intangible property resulting from human creativity. A critical element to the protection of IPR is restraining other persons from using the protected material without the prior permission of the owner.
• Trademarks: a form of intellectual property referring to names, signs, or words that are a distinctive identifier for a particular brand in the market, protected in Indian law by Trade Marks Act 1999. 
• Domain names included in IPR: in today’s digital world, a web address that helps customers easily find the business/organization online – a domain – is also considered a brand that should be registered as a trademark to prevent misuse.
• Value: trademarks are a great marketing tool that make the brand recognizable to the consumers, and directly correlates to an increase in the financial resources of the business. 
• Consequences: breach of IPR can lead to monetary loss, reputational damage, operational disruptions or even loss of market access for a business. Infringement therefore attracts significant criminal and civil liability, as a means to dissuade unauthorized use and protect such IPR owners.

In this regard, the positions adopted by RIL and the developer are briefly set out below: 

What is Cybersquatting?

‘Cybersquatting’ or digital squatting refers to the action of individuals who register domain names closely resembling established brands, often with the intent to sell for profit or otherwise leverage for personal gain. Cybersquatting can take the following forms:

• Typo squatting/URL hijacking: Domains are purchased with a typographical error in the name of a well-known brand, with the intent to divert the target audience when they misspell a domain name. This could occur with an error as simple as “gooogle.com” instead of “google.com”.
• Identity Theft: Existing brand’s website is copied with the intent to confuse the target consumer. 
• Name Jacking: Impersonation of a celebrity/famous public figure on the internet (includes creating fake websites/accounts on social media claiming to be such public figure). 
• ‘Reverse’ Cybersquatting: False claim of ownership over a trademark/domain name and accusing the domain owner of cybersquatting. 

Cybersquatting can be used as a form of extortion, an attempt to take over business from a rival, or even to mislead/scam consumers, but there is no law in India that specifically addresses such acts of cybersquatting. Since domains are considered ‘trademarks’ under the law, use of a similar or identical domain would render an individual liable for trademark infringement³, in addition to any other liabilities that may be applicable from the perspective of consumer protection laws.   

Legal Treatment of Cybersquatting

Cybersquatting rose as an issue as more and more businesses began to realize the value of their online presence in the market. As the digital age unfolded, the Internet Corporation of Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) was founded in 1998 as a non-profit corporation based out of the United States with global participation. In 1999, the ICANN adopted the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) to set out parameters in which top level domain disputes are resolved through arbitration. It is important to note that the remedies available under UDRP are only cancellation or transfer of the disputed domain name and do not envisage monetary compensation for any loss suffered. This was ratified in India through the .IN Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (INDRP) which is available to all domains registered with .in or .bharat.

Procedure under ICANN/UDRP

1. File a Complaint: Approach a provider organization like the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre (ADNDRC), or the Arab Center for Dispute Resolution (ACDR). Complaints must demonstrate certain key elements.
2. Submissions: The respondent is notified of the complaint and UDRP proceedings initiated. Respondents are given 20 days to submit a response to the complaint defending their actions.
3. Ruling: A panel with 1 or 3 members is appointed to review the submissions and evaluate the complaint. The panel renders a decision within 14 days of the response submission deadline.
4. Implementation and Judicial Recourse: 10 day period is given to the losing party to seek judicial relief in the competent courts. The Registrar of ICANN will implement the panel’s decision on expiry of this period. Either party can seek to challenge the decision in a court of competent relief. The panel’s decision remains binding until overturned by a court order. 

Key Elements to a Successful Complaint of Cybersquatting

• Identical or Confusingly Similar Domain Name: The disputed domain name should be identical or confusingly similar to an established trademark or service mark to which the complainant has legal right of ownership;
• Lack of Legitimate Interest: The registrant of the domain name (i.e., the alleged squatter) should have no legitimate interest or right in the domain name; and 
• Bad Faith: The disputed domain name should be registered and being used in bad faith. 

Factors influencing the UNDRP Panel Review

• Disrupt Competitors: Intent of registrant was to disrupt the business of a competitor; 
• Sale/Transfer to Owner: Intent is to resell, transfer, rent or otherwise give right of use to the owner of the trademark; 
• Disrupt Reflection of Trademark: Intent is to disrupt the owner from reflecting their trademark in a corresponding domain name and whether a pattern of such conduct is observed by the domain name owner;
• Commercial Gain through Confusion: Intent is to attract internet users to the registrant’s website for commercial gain by capitalizing on the likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s trademark.

Remedies under Indian Law

As held by the Honorable Supreme Court of India, disputes on domain names are legally protected to the extent possible under the laws relating to passing off even if the operation of the Indian Trade Marks Act, 1999 is not extraterritorial (i.e., capable of application abroad). Thus, complainants of cybersquatting can pursue the standard reliefs available under the Trade Mark Act, 1999:

• Remedy for Infringement: Available only when the trademark is registered; 
• Remedy for Passing Off: Available even without registration of the trademark.

Notable Examples of Cybersquatting in India

With the evolution of the digital age, India has seen some notable judicial precedents that have shaped how cybersquatting is legally addressed:

The JioHotstar Case

The registration of the domain name “JioHotstar” by the unnamed developer amounts to a textbook case of cybersquatting, for which relief can be pursued by RIL and/or Star Television Productions Limited (respectively, the registered owners of “Jio” and “Hotstar” trademarks), either under Trade Marks Act, 1999 or through ICANN/UDRP, relying on the following factors: 

• Confusing Similarity: The domain name is confusingly similar to the registered trademarks owned by RIL and Star respectively. Though the formal transfer of trademark has not happened, RIL can still rely solely on the Jio trademark to claim similarity of the mark⁹. A joint application can also be filed by RIL and Star, as this domain registration would amount to infringement of two separate registered marks; 
• Lack of Legitimate Interest: The message posted by the developer on the domain webpage makes it clear that there is no legitimate interest in the domain name to be held by the developer. There is no common reference in public to him by the brand name “JioHotstar” and his clear intent to sell the name for profit evidences a lack of legitimate interest; 
• Bad Faith Registration: The transparent intent of the developer to sell the name to profit from the merger and fund his education (i.e., personal gain) evidences a bad faith registration. This is further bolstered by his statement recalling the rebranding of music platform Saavn to ‘JioSaavn’ post the acquisition by RIL’s Jio, which motivated the application for and registration of the domain name¹⁰. Bad faith is also recognised within the UDRP itself, when the purpose of the domain name registration is to gain valuable consideration in excess of documented out of pocket costs related directly to the domain name¹¹.

Conclusion

Given the intent behind such domain registrations arousing JioHotstar controversy, cybersquatting typically targets established, reputed brands. In fact, the domain name “JioSaavn.com” was itself the subject of a domain name  dispute for cybersquatting in 2018¹². Though the merger had swiftly navigated regulatory challenges including conditional approval from the Competition Commission of India and clearances from the National Company Law Tribunal and the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, the domain registration in an unrelated third party’s name serves to showcase the impact that issues such as cybersquatting can have on large scale mergers and acquisitions. The “noble” intent of the developer to use this registration to fund his education aside, the intent is still to leverage the registration for personal gain, thereby satisfying the conditions under law to establish bad faith registration and consequently, cybersquatting that amounts to an infringement of IPR. Interestingly, the domain registration has seemingly been transferred and the webpage now reflects the social service mission of two children in the UAE¹³. Given the now cross border nature of the dispute and the fact that Trade Marks Act, 1999 cannot be applied extraterritorially, the recourse available to RIL and/or Star to gain ownership of this domain would now be through the UDRP and prescribed dispute resolution mechanisms thereunder. However, in light of latest reports that the UAE siblings have offered to legally transfer the registration to RIL for free, it remains to be seen how this dispute will unfold.

NOTE: 

Recently, the domain “Jiostar.com” went live with a teaser message, “coming soon,” sparking speculation that it could be the official platform for Reliance Industries’ streaming services following the Reliance-Disney merger. While there is no official confirmation, many believe this new domain may replace or supplement “JioHotstar.com” in the wake of the cybersquatting issue.

FAQs on the JioHotstar Cybersquatting Case

1. What is cybersquatting?
Cybersquatting, also known as domain squatting, is the act of registering, selling, or using a domain name with the intent of profiting from the trademark of another person or business. Typically, cybersquatters aim to sell the domain to the rightful trademark owner or use it to redirect traffic for personal gain.

2. What does cybersquatting mean in the context of domain names?
In domain name cybersquatting, individuals register domains that closely resemble well-known brands, trademarks, or business names. This practice is intended to leverage the established brand’s reputation, either for financial gain or to redirect web traffic.

3. Are there examples of cybersquatting in India?
Yes, cybersquatting cases in India include notable legal battles such as Yahoo! v. Akash Arora, where the defendant registered the domain “YahooIndia.com,” and Bisleri v. Mr. Pramod Borse, involving the domain “Bisleri.com.” The recent JioHotstar domain row is another example, highlighting cybersquatting practices and legal implications.

4. What happened in the JioHotstar domain case?
An anonymous app developer registered “JioHotstar.com” shortly after news of the Reliance-Disney merger. The developer initially intended to sell the domain to Reliance Industries to fund his education, which led to claims of cybersquatting and trademark infringement.

5. Why is the JioHotstar domain considered a case of cybersquatting?
The JioHotstar domain is deemed cybersquatting because it combines two well-known trademarks, “Jio” and “Hotstar,” for potential personal gain, evidenced by the developer’s offer to sell the domain to Reliance. This action reflects typical cybersquatting behavior under both Indian law and international dispute resolution standards.

6. How does Indian law address cybersquatting?
Although India lacks specific cybersquatting laws, such cases can be pursued under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The Act offers remedies for trademark infringement and passing off, both of which can apply in cybersquatting disputes.

7. What legal recourse is available for cybersquatting cases in India?
Victims of cybersquatting can file a complaint under the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) through ICANN or under the .IN Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (INDRP) if the domain is registered with .in. In addition, they may pursue action under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, for trademark infringement or passing off.

8. Why is the JioHotstar domain case significant?
The JioHotstar domain row is a high-profile example of cybersquatting involving established brands. This case underscores the importance of protecting trademarks in India, particularly in the context of large mergers and acquisitions, as well as the challenges of cross-border cybersquatting disputes.

9. What are the steps to resolve a cybersquatting dispute under the UDRP?
To resolve a cybersquatting case, a complainant files a complaint with an organization like WIPO. The process includes notifying the domain owner, reviewing submissions, and having a panel render a decision. Remedies include transferring or canceling the domain but not monetary compensation.

10. How did the JioHotstar domain row end?
Initially, the domain was offered for sale by the developer, but later it was transferred to two UAE-based siblings. Given the now cross border nature of the dispute and the fact that Trade Marks Act, 1999 cannot be applied extraterritorially, the recourse available to RIL and/or Star to gain ownership of this domain would now be through the UDRP and prescribed dispute resolution mechanisms thereunder. However, in light of latest reports that the UAE siblings have offered to legally transfer the registration to RIL for free, it remains to be seen how this dispute will unfold.

References:

1. [1] https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/media/entertainment/media/reliance-disney-media-giant-may-be-born-in-november/articleshow/114477261.cms?from=mdr
   ↩︎
2. [2] https://www.business-standard.com/companies/news/delhi-techie-snags-jiohotstar-domain-asks-reliance-to-fund-cambridge-dream-124102400446_1.html
   ↩︎
3. [3] Under Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
   ↩︎
4. [4] 1999 ALR 620
   ↩︎
5. [5] 2001 SCC OnLine Del 444
   ↩︎
6. [6] WIPO Case No. D2005 0271
   ↩︎
7. [7] C.S. No. 335 of 2020
   ↩︎
8. [8] IA (Lodging) No. 38837 of 2022 in IA (Lodging) no. 26556 of 2022 in Commercial IP Suit (Lodging) No. 26549 of 2022
   ↩︎
9. [9] This argument has been successfully put forth by Decathlon SAS in previous UDRP case, where the domain name “decathlon-nike.com” was ordered to be transferred to Decathlon trademark owner despite a lack of consent from Nike, as there was no provision in the policy or rules requiring a third party consent [Decathlon SAS v Nadia Michalski Case No. D2014-1996, available here: https://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/search/text.jsp?case=D2014-1996].
   ↩︎
10. [10] https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/new-updates/cant-stand-against-reliance-app-maker-who-demanded-rs-1-crore-for-jiohotstar-com-domain-name-seeks-legal-help/articleshow/114543044.cms?from=mdr
    ↩︎
11.  [11] Paragraph 4(b)(i) of the UDRP (accessible here: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/policy-2024-02-21-en)
    ↩︎
12.  [12] WIPO Case No. D2018-1481 
    ↩︎
13. [13] https://www.hindustantimes.com/entertainment/web-series/techies-message-asking-reliance-1-crore-for-jiohotstar-domain-mysteriously-vanishes-uae-siblings-now-own-the-website-101729919899425.html
    ↩︎

Introduction

In June 2007, tech giant Infosys Ltd. introduced non-compete agreements for its employees¹. The clause, which was subsequently made part of the employment agreements, required that post termination of an employee, such employee agrees to not accept any offer of employment from: (i) any Infosys customer (from the last 12 months); and (ii) a named competitor of Infosys (including TCS, Wipro, Accenture, Cognizant and IBM) if the employment would require work with an Infosys customer (from the last 12 months), for a period of 6 months.

Following an increased attrition rate in Q4 of Financial Year 2022, the company began to implement this clause², leading to the Nascent Information Technology Employees Senate (NITES), an IT workers union based out of Pune, filing a complaint with the Union Labour Ministry in April 2022³. Deeming the application of the clause post exit of an employee from Infosys to be “illegal, unethical and arbitrary”, NITES demanded the removal of such clauses from the employment agreement. Defending the clause, Infosys issued a statement claiming that the non-compete clause was a “standard business practice in many parts of the world for employment contracts”, to include “controls of reasonable scope and duration” to protect the “confidentiality of information, customer connection and other legitimate business interests”⁴. 

While there is limited public information available on the outcome of the discussions between NITES, Infosys and the competent labor authorities, this throws light on an issue that has been the subject of legal discourse in India time and again: enforceability of non-compete contracts.

In this piece, we break down what non-compete is; the legal framework governing such contractual provisions; and practical considerations for employers and employees, to facilitate informed decision making at all levels. 

What is a Non-compete Clause?

Non-compete clauses are a contractual provision whereby a person exiting a business typically agrees to not start a new business, take up employment in or otherwise engage in any manner with a competing entity. Also termed as “negative covenants”, these clauses impose a contractual obligation on the person to not undertake certain activities. Consequently, failure to abide by these contractual restrictions would result in a breach of the contract: 

• Duration: Non-compete clauses can be for the duration of the employment relationship but also are typically contemplated for a specific period post termination, i.e., post exit of the individual from the business. 
• Limitations to Restrictions: These contractual restrictions are usually limited by geographical location or for a fixed period of time having the effect that the said person would be in breach of the non-compete agreement if they were to start a new business/engage with a competing entity within the same geographical area and within such time period.
• Who is Restricted: These clauses are typically built into employment agreements (particularly of founders and key managerial personnel) where access to confidential and proprietary information pertaining to a business (including with respect to intellectual property) is to be considered; if such information is used by the departing employee/founder/key employee, the likelihood of an unfair business advantage is increased.
• M&A perspective: Non-compete clauses are also seen in transaction documents executed in mergers and acquisitions, where the value of the investment can be impacted if exiting founders/key employees start or join a competing business, leading to loss of competitive advantage to the acquirer.

Can non-compete contracts be enforced in India?

Once a breach of contract is determined, the parties to such contract would have the appropriate remedial measures built in, which can typically include compensation for any loss suffered as a result of the breach. However, in order to be able to enforce such remedial measures, it is critical for the underlying contractual obligation itself to be enforceable. It is against this backdrop that the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (“ICA”) become relevant. Section 27 of the ICA stipulates that any agreement in restraint of trade is void. In other words, any agreement that restricts a person from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind is to that extent void⁵. Stemming from the fundamental right to practice any profession or occupation protected by Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, the intent 

behind Section 27 of the ICA is to guard against any interference with freedom of trade even if it results in interference with freedom of contract. 

However it is important to note that even within the Constitution, the freedoms protected by the fundamental rights are not absolute and can be limited within specified circumstances. Historically, the Supreme Court of India and various high courts across the country have consistently adopted the following approach towards enforceability of such negative covenants: 

• Reasonableness: The enforceability will be limited to the extent that such a negative covenant is reasonable⁶; and
• Legitimacy: The purpose of the negative covenant is to protect the legitimate business interests of the buyer. The restraint cannot be greater than necessary to protect the interest concerned⁷. 

In light of the above, the Indian courts have adopted the approach that these restrictions during the period of employment are valid, as they can be considered legitimate for the protection of the business interests of the company. Against this reasoning, Section 27 would not be violated⁸. However, such obligations cannot be unconscionable, excessively harsh, unreasonable or one-sided, i.e., satisfying the requirement of reasonableness and legitimacy..

The controversy associated with such negative covenants arises when they are sought to be enforced beyond the period of employment. In a high profile ruling, the Supreme Court held that a media management company’s non-compete clause that prevented a prominent Indian cricketer from joining their competitor for a specific period of time after their agreement had terminated, could not be enforced⁹. The principle that enforcement of non-compete beyond the period of employment is void under Section 27 has been well-settled¹⁰. In a pattern followed by high courts across the country, post-termination non-compete clauses have generally not been enforced on the rationale that the right to livelihood of a person must prevail over the interests of an employer¹¹.

However, this is not to say that all non-compete clauses are automatically unenforceable. For instance, the Delhi High Court held that while employees who had already accepted the offer of employment with the competitor could not be injuncted against (as the same would read a negative covenant into their employment contracts which would violate Section 27), an injunction against future solicitation could be granted on the grounds it was a legitimate and reasonable restriction¹².

Given the uncertainty over enforcement of non-compete clauses, employers have adopted a novel approach of inserting a “garden leave” clause, during which the employee is fully paid their salary for the period in which they are restricted by such negative covenants. While such a concept has been held by the Bombay High Court to be a prima facie restraint of trade affected by Section 27¹³, it is a popular solution practiced widely by employers. Additionally, restrictions on non-disclosure of confidential information and non-solicitation of customers and employees have been previously enforced¹⁴. Non-compete obligations are also often found in mergers and acquisitions transactions, with the courts permitting such restrictions on the basis of specified local limits that are reasonable to the court, having regard to the nature of business/industry concerned¹⁵. 

Practical Considerations

Despite the trend of non-enforceability of non-compete contracts, such negative covenants are commonly found in employment and M&A contracts. These restrictions are still seen as soft deterrents, with employees preferring to comply rather than bear litigation costs and the burden of being sued by a former employer¹⁶. Here are some practical considerations for employers and employees when considering a non-compete contract: 

• Legitimacy: Employers should carefully consider whether the non-compete restriction is necessary to protect business interests. It would be prudent for employers to undertake a reasonable calculation of quantifiable harm and risk from such a breach and inform the employees of the same. 
• Reasonableness: The clause should consider: (i) the duration of restriction and geographical scope; (ii) nature of the employees position and exposure to trade secrets, proprietary information, etc.; (iii) availability of alternative employment; and (iv) compensation in terms of salary, etc. for the duration of restriction.  
• Review Impact: It is critical that employees are made fully aware of the extent to which such negative covenants are applicable and the legitimacy and reasonableness of the same arising from the impact of the employee’s departure from the organization.  

Conclusion

Non-compete clauses continue to face enforceability challenges, with the most recent example being Wipro’s lawsuit against its former CFO for violating the restriction in his employment contract and joining Cognizant as a competitor in December 2023¹⁷. India’s judicial approach to enforceability of post-termination non-compete clauses is clear: if it is not permissible within the scope of Section 27, it would not be enforceable. This differs from jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom, where post-termination restrictions that are designed to protect a proprietary interest of an employer or buyer are enforceable provided there is a material risk and the restriction is itself reasonable, are enforceable; and the United States, where the US Federal Trade Commission recently banned non-compete clauses for US workers¹⁸. The clear conclusion is that a uniform approach to enforcement of negative covenants cannot be adopted.  

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) on Non-Compete Clauses

1. What is a non-compete clause?

A non-compete clause is a contractual restriction that prevents an employee from joining a competitor or starting a competing business after leaving a company. It may include specific limitations on time, geographic location, and types of activities.

2. Are non-compete clauses legally enforceable in India?

In India, enforceability of non-compete clauses is limited. Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act deems any restraint of trade to be void. While certain in-employment restrictions may be valid, post-employment restrictions are generally not enforceable, as they can interfere with an individual’s right to livelihood.

3. Why do companies use non-compete clauses if they are often unenforceable?

Despite legal limitations, companies may still include non-compete clauses to act as deterrents. Many employees prefer to comply rather than face potential legal disputes.

4. What are some exceptions where non-compete clauses may be enforceable?

Non-compete clauses may be enforceable if they are reasonable in scope and necessary to protect legitimate business interests, such as confidential information or trade secrets. Courts may uphold them if they are limited to the duration of employment or for protecting specific business interests.

5. How does India’s approach compare with other countries?

India’s approach to non-compete clauses is more restrictive compared to countries like the UK, where reasonable post-termination restrictions are often enforceable if they protect a legitimate proprietary interest. In the US, non-compete laws vary by state, and recently, the Federal Trade Commission proposed a ban on non-competes for American workers.

6. What is a “garden leave” clause, and how does it relate to non-compete agreements?

A garden leave clause allows employees to remain on payroll after they resign or are terminated, but restricts them from joining competitors during this period. Although some Indian courts view it as a restraint of trade, it’s a popular alternative to non-compete clauses.

7. Can non-compete clauses be included in M&A agreements?

Yes, non-compete clauses are common in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) to protect the buyer’s investment and maintain competitive advantage. Courts may allow such clauses if they are reasonable and necessary for the protection of business interests.

8. What are the practical considerations for employees facing a non-compete clause?

Employees should assess the reasonableness and impact of any non-compete clause, including its duration, scope, and potential limitations on future employment opportunities.

9. What options do employees have if they disagree with a non-compete clause?

Employees may negotiate the terms before signing or, if already in effect, seek legal advice to understand the likelihood of enforceability based on Indian law and precedent cases.

1. [1] https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/company/corporate-trends/infy-asks-staffs-to-sign-pact-against-joining-rivals/articleshow/2101866.cms?from=mdr ↩︎
2. [2] https://www.businesstoday.in/latest/corporate/story/infosys-served-notice-by-union-labour-ministry-over-its-non-compete-clause-in-employee-contract-331508-2022-04-27 ↩︎
3. [3] https://nites.co.in/nites-submits-complaint-against-infosys-illegal-non-compete-agreement-to-labour-ministry/#:~:text=The%20employee’s%20covenants%20should%20be,clause%20from%20the%20employment%20agreements. ↩︎
4. [4]  ibid, 2 above. ↩︎
5. [5] The Indian Contract Act, 1872 exempts such restraint of trade contracts for transactions where the goodwill of a business is sold. ↩︎
6. [6] As laid down by the Supreme Court in Niranjan Shankar Golikari v Century Spinning and Mfg. Co. (1967) 2 SCR 378. ↩︎
7. [7] As laid down by the Supreme Court in Gujarat Bottling Co Ltd v The Coca Cola Co & Ors. (1995) SCC (5) 545. ↩︎
8. [8] As laid down by the Supreme Court in Niranjan Shankar Golikari v Century Spinning and Mfg. Co. (1967) 2 SCR 378. ↩︎
9. [9] As laid down by the Supreme Court in Percept D’Mark (India) Pvt. Ltd. v Zaheer Khan and Ors. Appeal (Civil) 5573-5574 of 2004. ↩︎
10. [10] As laid down by the Supreme Court in Superintendence Company of India (P) Ltd. v Krishan Murgai 1981 2 SCC 246. ↩︎
11. [11] Trend observed in rulings of: (i) Bombay High Court in VFS Global Services Pvt. Ltd. v Mr. Suprit Roy 2008 (3) MhLj 266; and (ii) Delhi High Court in Affle Holdings Pte. Ltd. v Saurabh Singh 2015 SCC OnLine Del 6765, and Wipro Limited v Beckman Coulter International S.A. 2006 (3) ARBLR 118 (Delhi). ↩︎
12. [12] As laid down by the Delhi High Court in Wipro Limited v Beckman Coulter International S.A. 2006 (3) ARBLR 118 (Delhi). ↩︎
13. [13] In VFS Global Services Private Limited v Mr. Suprit Roy 2008 (3) MhLj 266, the Bombay High Court reasoned that the payment of salary during garden leave does not renew the contract of employment and therefore amounted to a prima facie restraint of trade. ↩︎
14. [14] As held by: (i) Madras High Court in E-merge Tech Global Services Private Limited v M. R. Vindhyasagar and Ors. C.S. No. 258 of 2020; and (ii) Bombay High Court in Zee Telefilms Limited v Sundial Communications Private Limited 2003 (5) BOM CR 404. ↩︎
15. [15] As held by the Delhi High Court in Ozone Spa Pvt. Ltd. v Pure Fitness & Ors. 2015 222 DLT 372. ↩︎
16. [16] https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/jobs/c-suite/non-compete-clauses-unenforceable-under-law-but-companies-love-them/articleshow/109633571.cms?from=mdr ↩︎
17. [17] https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/jobs/c-suite/non-compete-clauses-unenforceable-under-law-but-companies-love-them/articleshow/109633571.cms?from=mdr ↩︎
18. [18] https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/noncompete-rule.pdf ↩︎

In the complex world of corporate governance, the role of board observers has emerged as a key component, especially in the wake of increased investor scrutiny, particularly in the private equity (PE) and venture capital (VC) sectors. With growing financial uncertainty, investors are looking for ways to maintain a closer watch on companies without assuming directorial risks. One such method is by appointing a board observer, a role that, although devoid of statutory voting power, can wield significant influence.

A board observer’s position in the intricate realm of corporate governance is crucial and varied. With increased distress particularly in the private equity sector, we may see investors deploying various tools to keep a closer eye on the company’s financial performance. Appointing a board observer is one such tool.

Despite not having statutory authority or the ability to vote, board observers have a special position of influence and can provide productive insights.

Board observers quite literally are individuals who are fundamentally appointed with the task to ‘observe’. They act as representatives typically from major investors, strategic partners, or key stakeholders, and are granted access to board meetings.

Understanding the Role of Board Observers

Board observers are not formal members of the board, nor do they hold the power to vote on corporate decisions. However, their presence in board meetings is a tool used primarily by major investors, strategic partners, and other key stakeholders to monitor the company’s strategic direction and financial health. These individuals are entrusted with providing valuable insights without the direct legal responsibilities that directors typically face.

Although board observers do not have a formal vote, their influence can shape company strategies. This unique role enables them to represent the interests of investors or stakeholders while remaining free from the direct obligations of fiduciary duties.

Board Observer Rights – How does it work?

Investors involved in the venture capital (VC) and private equity (PE) spaces often negotiate for a board seat with the intent to contribute to the decision-making process and protect their interests by having representation on the board. A recent trend, however, indicates that these investors are reluctant to formally exercise their nomination rights owing to the possible risks/liabilities associated with directorships, such as fiduciary duties and vicarious liability that is often intertwined in the acts and omissions of the company, which can lead to such directors being identified as “officers in default”.

The rights and responsibilities of a board observer are distinct from those of a nominee director, primarily due to the lack of formal voting authority. Accordingly, board observers are relieved from the direct fiduciary duties that are normally connected with board membership since their position is specified contractually rather than by statutory board responsibilities.

Is a Board Observer an officer in default?

The Act provides a definition for the term “Officer” which inter alia includes any person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the board of directors of the company or any one or more of the directors are accustomed to act. Additionally, the term “Officer in Default” states that an Officer of the company who is in default will incur liability in terms of imprisonment, penalties, fines or otherwise, regardless of their lack of an official position in the company.

Accordingly, any person who exercises substantial decision-making authority on the board of the company may be covered as an Officer in Default.

While board observers may not be equivalent to formal directors, the litmus test lies in determining where the decision-making power truly resides, leading to potential liabilities that may surpass the protections sought by investors. 

Observers are not subject to a company’s breach of any statutory provisions because their appointment is based on a contractual obligation rather than a statutory one, unlike nominee directors who are permitted to participate in board meetings.

Even though board observers are not designated as directors, they run the risk of being seen as “Shadow Directors” if they have a significant amount of authority or influence over the decisions made by the company.

The Legal Perspective on Board Observers

Unlike nominee directors, who are formally appointed and legally bound to fulfill statutory responsibilities, board observers are appointed through contractual obligations. This shields them from liabilities tied to breaches of statutory provisions. However, as their influence grows, so does the risk of being classified as shadow directors, particularly if they are perceived as playing a significant role in decision-making.

Conclusion

Corporate Governance is an evolving concept, especially in the context of active investor participation. In order to foster a corporate environment that is legally robust, it will be imperative to strike a balance between active investor participation and legal prudence. That being said, as businesses continue to navigate complex and evolving landscapes, the value of a well-integrated board observer cannot be overstated. A board observer can bring clarity to the business and operations of an investee company without attaching the risk of incurring statutory liability for acts/omissions by the company. This is a significant factor that makes the option of a board observer nomination more attractive to PE and VC investors, vis-a-vis the appointment of a nominee director.

FAQs on Board Observers

1. What is a board observer in corporate governance?
   A board observer is an individual appointed by investors or key stakeholders to attend board meetings without having formal voting power. They offer insights and monitor the company’s performance, primarily to protect the interests of those they represent.
2. How do board observers differ from directors?
   Unlike board directors, board observers do not have the authority to vote on decisions or take on fiduciary duties. Their role is more about observation and providing feedback rather than participating in the decision-making process.
3. What are the rights of a board observer?
   A board observer has the right to attend board meetings and access key company information, but they do not hold any voting rights. Their responsibilities and rights are typically outlined in a contractual agreement between the company and the observer’s appointing party.
4. Can board observers influence corporate decisions?
   Yes, board observers can provide valuable insights and advice that may influence corporate decisions, but they do not have direct decision-making power. Their influence comes from their ability to offer expert advice and represent investors’ interests.
5. Are board observers liable for company decisions?
   Generally, board observers are not legally liable for company decisions as they are not formal board members. However, if their influence over board decisions becomes significant, they could be viewed as shadow directors, which might expose them to certain legal liabilities.
6. Why do investors appoint board observers instead of directors?
   Investors often prefer appointing board observers because it allows them to monitor company performance and offer guidance without taking on the fiduciary duties and potential liabilities associated with being a formal board member.
7. What is the risk of being considered a shadow director as a board observer?
   If a board observer has significant influence over board decisions, they could be classified as a shadow director. Shadow directors can be held liable for the company’s actions, similar to formally appointed directors, especially in cases of misconduct or financial mismanagement.
8. How does a board observer benefit private equity and venture capital investors?
   Board observers allow PE and VC investors to maintain oversight of their portfolio companies, ensuring the company’s strategic direction aligns with their interests. This role provides investors with valuable insights without the risk of statutory liabilities that come with directorship.

In the ever-evolving landscape of the SaaS industry, understanding the various types of agreements is crucial for businesses to operate effectively and legally. From customer contracts to partner agreements, these legal documents form the backbone of SaaS operations. By navigating the intricacies of these agreements, businesses can protect their intellectual property, establish clear terms of service, and mitigate potential risks. In this comprehensive guide, we will explore the key types of agreements used in the SaaS industry, providing valuable insights for both established companies and startups.

What is SaaS? 

Software as a Service (“SaaS”), is a way of delivering software applications over the internet. Instead of purchasing and installing software on your computer, you access it online through a subscription. This makes it easier to use and manage, as updates, security, and maintenance are handled by the service provider. Examples of SaaS include tools like Google Workspace or Microsoft 365, where everything is accessible from a web browser. This model is convenient for businesses because it reduces upfront costs and offers scalability based on their needs.

What are SaaS Agreements? 

However, beneath the surface of this convenient access lies a complex web of agreements that govern the relationship between SaaS providers and their customers, which are essential to ensuring a smooth and secure experience for all parties involved. These agreements outline the terms of using a cloud-based software service. These agreements specify the rights and responsibilities of both parties, covering aspects such as subscription fees, data privacy, service availability, support, and usage limitations.

This article delves into the various types of agreements that form the backbone of the SaaS industry and it will explore their key components, importance, and how they work together to create a win-win situation for both SaaS providers and their subscribers.

What are the types of Agreement in SaaS Industry

In the SaaS industry, various types of agreements are commonly used to establish the terms of service, licensing, and other legal arrangements between the SaaS provider and its customers. Here are some key types of agreements used in the SaaS industry:

Terms of Service (ToS) or Terms of Use (ToU)

These agreements outline the terms and conditions under which users are allowed to access and use the SaaS platform. They typically cover aspects such as user obligations, limitations of liability, intellectual property rights, privacy policies, and dispute resolution procedures.
Key Components: User obligations, limitations of liability, intellectual property rights, privacy policies, dispute resolution procedures.
Importance: Provides clarity and sets apt expectations for users regarding acceptable use of the SaaS platform, protecting the provider from misuse and establishing guidelines for resolving disputes.

Service Level Agreement (SLA)

SLAs define the level of service that the SaaS provider agrees to deliver to its customers, including uptime guarantees, response times for support requests, and performance metrics. SLAs also often outline the remedies available to customers in the event that service levels are not met.
Key Components: Uptime guarantees, response times for support requests, performance metrics, remedies for breaches.
Importance: Defines the quality of service expected by customers, establishes accountability for the SaaS provider, and offers assurances to customers regarding system reliability and support responsiveness

Master Services Agreement (MSA)

An MSA is a comprehensive contract that governs the overall relationship between the SaaS provider and the customer. It typically includes general terms and conditions applicable to all services provided, as well as specific terms related to individual transactions or services.
Key Components: General terms and conditions, specific terms related to individual transactions or services, payment terms, termination clauses.
Importance: Forms the foundation of the contractual relationship between the SaaS provider and the customer, streamlining the process for future transactions and ensuring consistency in terms across multiple agreements.

Subscription Agreement:

This agreement outlines the terms of the subscription plan selected by the customer, including pricing, payment terms, subscription duration, and any applicable usage limits or restrictions.
Key Components: Pricing, payment terms, subscription duration, usage limits, renewal terms.
Importance: Specifies the terms of the subscription plan selected by the customer, including pricing and payment obligations, ensuring transparency and clarity in the commercial relationship.

Data Processing Agreement (DPA)

DPAs are used when the SaaS provider processes personal data on behalf of the customer, particularly in relation to data protection regulations such as GDPR. These agreements specify the rights and obligations of both parties regarding the processing and protection of personal data.
Key Components: Data processing obligations, data security measures, rights and responsibilities of both parties regarding personal data as laid down in India’s Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023, and GDPR compliance.
Importance: Ensures compliance with data protection regulations, establishes safeguards for the processing of personal data, and defines the roles and responsibilities of each party in protecting data privacy.

Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA)

NDAs are used to protect confidential information exchanged between the SaaS provider and the customer during the course of their relationship. They prevent either party from disclosing sensitive information to third parties without consent.
Key Components: Definition of confidential information, obligations of confidentiality, exceptions to confidentiality, duration of the agreement.
Importance: Protects sensitive information shared between parties from unauthorized disclosure, fostering trust and enabling the exchange of confidential information necessary for business collaboration.

End User License Agreement (EULA)

If the SaaS platform includes downloadable software or applications, an EULA may be required to govern the use of that software by end users. EULAs specify the rights and restrictions associated with the use of the software.
Key Components: Software license grant, permitted uses and restrictions, intellectual property rights, termination clauses.
Importance: Establishes the rights and obligations of end users regarding the use of software, ensuring compliance with licensing terms and protecting the provider’s intellectual property rights.

Beta Testing Agreement

When a SaaS provider offers a beta version of its software for testing purposes, a beta testing agreement may be used to outline the terms and conditions of the beta program, including feedback requirements, confidentiality obligations, and limitations of liability.
Key Components: Scope of the beta program, feedback requirements, confidentiality obligations, limitations of liability.
Importance: Sets the terms for participation in beta testing, manages expectations regarding the beta software’s functionality and stability, and protects the provider from potential risks associated with beta testing activities.

These are some of the most common types of agreements used in the SaaS industry, though the specific agreements required may vary depending on the nature of the SaaS offering and the requirements of the parties involved.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Software as a Service (SaaS) industry relies on a variety of agreements to establish and govern the relationships between SaaS providers and their customers. Each agreement plays a crucial role in defining the terms of service, protecting intellectual property, ensuring data privacy and security, and mitigating risks for both parties involved. From Terms of Service outlining user responsibilities to Service Level Agreements guaranteeing performance standards, and from Data Processing Agreements ensuring compliance with regulations like GDPR to Non-Disclosure Agreements safeguarding confidential information, these agreements collectively form the legal backbone of the SaaS ecosystem. By clearly delineating rights, obligations, and expectations, these agreements promote transparency, trust, and effective collaboration in the dynamic landscape of cloud-based software delivery. As the SaaS industry continues to evolve, these agreements will remain essential tools for fostering mutually beneficial partnerships and driving innovation in the digital economy.

FAQs on Types of SaaS Agreements

Q. What is the significance of agreements in the SaaS industry?

Agreements play a crucial role in defining the legal relationships between SaaS providers and their customers, outlining rights, obligations, and terms of service.

Q. What are the key types of agreements used in the SaaS industry?

Common agreements in the SaaS industry include Terms of Service (ToS), Service Level Agreements (SLAs), Master Services Agreements (MSAs), Subscription Agreements, Data Processing Agreements (DPAs), Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDAs), End User License Agreements (EULAs), and Beta Testing Agreements.

Q. What is the purpose of a Terms of Service (ToS) agreement in the SaaS industry?

ToS agreements establish the rules and guidelines for using the SaaS platform, including user responsibilities, intellectual property rights, and dispute resolution procedures.

Q. How do Service Level Agreements (SLAs) benefit customers in the SaaS industry?

SLAs define the level of service that the SaaS provider commits to delivering, including uptime guarantees, support response times, and performance metrics, offering assurances to customers regarding service quality.

Q. What does a Master Services Agreement (MSA) encompass in the SaaS industry?

MSAs serve as comprehensive contracts governing the overall relationship between SaaS providers and customers, covering general terms, specific transaction details, payment terms, and termination clauses.

Q. What is the purpose of Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDAs) in the SaaS industry?

NDAs protect confidential information exchanged between parties during the course of their relationship, preventing unauthorized disclosure and fostering trust in business collaborations.

Q. How do End User License Agreements (EULAs) affect users of SaaS platforms?

EULAs define the terms of use for software provided by SaaS platforms, including permitted uses, restrictions, and intellectual property rights, ensuring compliance and protecting the provider’s interests.

Q. What is the role of Beta Testing Agreements in the SaaS industry?

Beta Testing Agreements establish terms for participating in beta programs, outlining feedback requirements, confidentiality obligations, and limitations of liability for both parties involved in testing new software releases.

Q. How can businesses ensure they are effectively using these agreements in the SaaS industry?

Businesses should carefully review, customize, and regularly update these agreements to reflect evolving legal requirements, industry standards, and the specific needs of their SaaS offerings and customer base.

Introduction

As part and parcel of a transaction, companies seeking investment provide their investors with certain rights, which are contractually negotiated. These range from receiving periodic reports on the business and financials of the company to representation on the board of directors and the right to be involved in certain key decisions required to be taken by the company in the course of their growth. Such rights are typically requested by investors based on factors such as the nature of the investment (i.e., financial or strategic) and the level of insight into the business, operations and management of the company required. In such transactions, these rights (and the extent) are agreed upon and captured in a shareholders’ agreement (“SHA”) between the parties, whereas the rights and obligations pertaining to the fundraising itself are governed by the investment agreement.

 Typically, investors (especially foreign) and companies/founders agree to arbitrate any disputes arising from the investment agreement or the SHA. However, referring a dispute to arbitration is often not as clear-cut as a contractual agreement between parties. Indian courts have repeatedly been required to provide rulings on whether or not arbitration can be invoked by the parties to a SHA. This issue is complicated further by conflicting judicial precedents which have ultimately resulted in an unclear understanding of the law forming the basis of how parties can agree to arbitrate any disputes.

 In this article Dispute Resolution in the Articles of Association (AOA), we have provided an overview of the contested legal position and our suggestions for navigating the murky landscape, with the fundamental goal of ensuring the parties’ contractually documented intent is protected and legally enforceable.

Relationship between a Shareholders’ Agreement and the Articles of Association (‘AOA’)

What is the AOA?

Similar to how the constitution of India forms the basis of Indian democracy, the memorandum of association (‘MOA’) and AOA form the basis for a company’s legal existence. The MOA can be seen as the constitutional document that lays down the fundamental elements and broad scope within which the company, business, and operations will typically operate. However, it is the AOA that puts in place a ‘rulebook’, prescribing the regulations and by-laws that govern the company and in effect, enshrining and giving effect to the principles of the MOA. 

It is crucial to understand that because a company is seen as a separate legal person, the AOA is a critical document that establishes the legal relationship between the shareholders of the company inter se and with the company. In order to lay the framework for the operations of the company, an AOA will include provisions (in accordance with applicable laws) that: 

(i)    regulate internal affairs and operations of the company; 

(ii)   provide clarity on procedures the company must follow; 

(iii)  govern the issue/buyback of securities and clarify the legal rights and obligations of shareholders holding different classes of securities; and 

(iv)  legitimize the authority of the board of directors and their functions. 

It is, therefore, a reasonable presumption that any action undertaken by a company must be authorised by the AOA/MOA. Any amendment or alteration to these documents would not only require the assent of the board, but also of the shareholders (i.e., members of the company), and requires filing with the competent Registrar of Companies under the Companies Act, 2013. While these procedures are in place primarily to protect the shareholders from mischief by the company, the lengthy process involved in altering the AOA serves to highlight how essential a document it is for a company’s action to hold legal justification.  

How does the shareholders’ agreement typically become enforceable? 

Often in transaction documents, a critical mechanism that enables the enforcement of the investor rights agreed in the SHA is captured in the investment agreement, where as part of the conditions required to be satisfied upon receipt of the investment amount by the company, the company, and founders must also ensure that the AOA is suitably amended to codify the investor rights. 

However, the legal justification for this action in itself finds a conflict between two different schools regarding the enforceability of provisions from the SHA that have not been incorporated into the AOA: 

(i) The “incorporation” view – the prominent authority for this view is the ruling of the High Court of Delhi in World Phone India Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. WPI Group Inc. USA (the “World Phone Case”)[1], where it was held that a board resolution passed without considering an affirmative voting right granted to a shareholder under a joint venture agreement, was legally valid in light of the company’s AOA, which contained no such restriction. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in V.B. Rangaraj v. V.B. Gopalakrishnan (the “Rangaraj Case”)[2] and subsequent decision of the Bombay High Court in IL&FS Trust Co. Ltd. v. Birla Perucchini Ltd. (the “Birla Perucchini Case”)[3], the Delhi High Court was of the view that the joint venture agreement could not bind the company unless incorporated into the AOA. 

The Rangaraj Case is of particular interest in this school of thought because while the issue dealt with share transfer restrictions, the Supreme Court held that it was evident from the provisions of the erstwhile Companies Act, 1956 that the transfer of shares is a matter regulated by the AOA of the subject company and any restriction not specified in the AOA was not binding on the company or its shareholders. Crucially, the World Phone Case poses a problem in the legal interpretation of the “incorporation” view because the Delhi High Court has carried the ratio of the Rangaraj Case to a logical conclusion and observed that even where the subject company is party to an SHA, the provisions regarding management of affairs of the company cannot be enforced unless incorporated into the AOA. 

(ii)   the “contractual” view – the prominent authority for this view is the ruling of the Supreme Court in Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v Union of India (the “Vodafone Case”)[4], where the Supreme Court disagreed with the ratio in the Rangaraj Case, without expressly overruling it, and held that freedom of contract includes the freedom of shareholders to define their rights and share-transfer restrictions. This was found to not be in violation of any law and therefore not be subject to incorporation within the AOA. This has also been supported by the Delhi High Court in Spectrum Technologies USA Inc. v Spectrum Power Generation[5] and in Premier Hockey Development Pvt. Ltd. v Indian Hockey Federation[6]. In fact, in the latter case, the Delhi High Court was of the view that the subject company, being party to both an SHA and a share subscription and shareholders agreement containing an obligation to modify the AOA to incorporate the SHA, was conclusive in binding the subject company to the same despite an absence of incorporation into the AOA. 

How can this fundamental disagreement be reconciled?

It is difficult to reconcile the issues caused by conflicting rulings from the same judicial authority. Given that the circumstances of each case provide scope for situation-specific reasoning, we cannot conclusively say one view is preferred, or more appropriate, over the other. Further, where the courts have stopped short of conclusively overruling previous judgments (for instance the Supreme Court on the Vodafone Case only disagreed with the ratio of the Rangaraj Case), the result is an unclear understanding of the legal position regarding the enforceability of SHA without incorporation in the AOA.   

It is also pertinent to note that the issues in the above rulings also deal with the enforceability of certain shareholder rights that have been contractually agreed upon (such as affirmative votes or share transfer restrictions). By contrast, dispute resolution is a mechanism contractually agreed upon between the parties in the event of any dispute/breach of the SHA and cannot be characterized as a “right” of any shareholder(s), in the true sense of the word. However, in light of the conflicting principles guiding the “incorporation” and “contractual” views, the lack of clarity extends to the inclusion of dispute resolution in the AOA simply to make the intent of parties to approach arbitration, enforceable. 

Incorporation of arbitration clauses

Flowing from the “incorporation” view, the Delhi High Court, relying on the Rangaraj Case, World Phone Case, and the Birla Perucchini Case, held in Umesh Kumar Baveja v IL&FS Transportation Network[7] that despite the subject company being a party to the SHA, it was the AOA that governed the relationship between the parties and that since they did not contain any arbitration provision, the parties could not be referred to arbitration. A similar ruling was passed by the Company Law Board, Mumbai in Ishwardas Rasiwasia Agarwal v Akshay Ispat Udyog Pvt. Ltd.[8], where it was held the non-incorporation of the arbitration clause into the AOA of the subject company was fatal to the request for a reference to arbitration, despite findings that the dispute was contractual in nature and arbitrable. 

A second line of reasoning flowing from the “contractual” view has attempted to uphold the contractual intent of the parties reflected in an SHA. In Sidharth Gupta v Getit Infoservices Pvt. Ltd.[9], the Company Law Board, Delhi was required to rule on the reference to arbitration. Relying on the facts that the SHA had been incorporated verbatim into the AOA and the subject company was a party to the SHA, the Company Law Board rejected the argument from an “incorporation” view and remarked on the importance of holding shareholders “to their bargain” when significant money had been invested on the basis of the parties’ understanding recorded in the SHA. It is pertinent to note in this case, that the Company Law Board had been directed by the Supreme Court to dispose of the case without being influenced by the decisions of the Delhi High Court. This led the Company Law Board to not consider the ruling of the Delhi High Court in the World Phone Case as binding. 

An unusual third line of reasoning has also been provided by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in EIH Ltd. v State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.[10]. In this case, a dispute regarding a breach of AOA was referred to arbitration under the arbitration clause of the constitutive joint venture agreement to which the resultant company was not a party. The High Court held that the joint venture agreement and the AOA of the subject company were part of the same transaction, where the primary contractual relationship was contained in the joint venture agreement, and that the AOA functioned as a “facilitative sister agreement” to the same. Given the critical nature of the AOA to the internal governance of the subject company as a juristic person however, this line of reasoning where the AOA is relegated to a “sister agreement” is likely to not stand the test of a comprehensive judicial review of this issue.

Navigating the landscape and concluding thoughts

The startup growth trajectory continues to contribute significantly to the Indian economy, with funding crossing USD 5.3 billion in the first six months of 2024 and over 915 investors participating in funding deals[11]. This will see a proportional rise in investor-company disputes, and when reference to arbitration is contractually agreed but not enshrined in the SHA, this can lead to further delays at the stage of dispute resolution, where the competent court would be required to first rule on whether the reference to arbitration can even be enforced. However, the conflicting judicial precedents are only the tip of this murky iceberg; party autonomy is a fundamental guiding principle to any reference to arbitration. Where judicial precedent sets the grounds for formal incorporation into the AOA as a condition to enforcing this party intent, however, a question of whether the parties’ contractually documented intent is being ignored, is raised. 

Further, the legal basis for the “incorporation” view is itself under question. A key component from the Rangaraj Case is that the Supreme Court based its ruling on the issue of share transfer restrictions and basis the provision of Companies Act, 1956 that stated a company’s shares are “transferable in the manner provided by the articles of the company”. This position has also been questioned by a larger bench of the Supreme Court in the Vodafone Case and by academics and has been distinguished and disregarded by lower High Courts on slim grounds. Consequently, the judicial precedent has been applied to a non-share transfer context as well, forming the basis for the incorporation view on arbitration clauses.  

In conclusion, while it is our opinion that a contract-centric approach is more reflective of party intent, especially with reference to arbitration, the insistence on incorporating provisions of the SHA into the AOA would pose a potential roadblock in the event the parties are required to approach dispute resolution. Pending clarity from the judiciary on this issue, the best approach to dealing with this situation is adopting a conservative approach of incorporating dispute resolution provisions within the AOA, preventing delays in the event of a dispute between the parties. 

[1] World Phone India Pvt. Ltd. v. WPI Group Inc. USA 2013 SCC OnLine Del 1098.

[2] V.B. Rangaraj v. V.B. Gopalakrishnan (1992) 1 SCC 160.

[3] IL&FS Trust Co. Ltd. v. Birla Perucchini Ltd. 2002 SCC OnLine Bom 1004

[4] Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 613.

[5] Spectrum Technologies USA Inc. v. Spectrum Power Generation, 2000 SCC OnLine DEL 472

[6] Premier Hockey Development Pvt. Ltd. v. Indian Hockey Federation, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 2621

[7] Umesh Kumar Baveja v. IL&FS Transportation Network, 2013 SCC OnLine Del 6436

[8] Ishwardas Rasiwasia Agarwal v. Akshay Ispat Udyog Pvt. Ltd., C.A. 328/2013 in CP 117/2013 (Compay Law Board, Mumbai Bench) (Unreported).

[9] Sidharth Gupta v. Getit Infoservices Pvt. Ltd., C.A.128/C-II/2014 in CP No. 64(ND)/2014 (Company Law Board, New Delhi Bench) (Unreported).

[10] EIH Ltd. v. State of Himachal Pradesh, Arb Case 60/2005 (H.P. H.C.) (Unreported).

[11] https://inc42.com/buzz/at-5-3-bn-indian-startup-funding-stays-flat-yoy-in-h1-2024/#:~:text=According%20to%20Inc42’s%20’H1%202024,the%20first%20half%20of%202024.

IFSCA listing regulations requires debt securities to adhere to international standards/principles to be labelled as “𝐠𝐫𝐞𝐞𝐧”, “𝐬𝐨𝐜𝐢𝐚𝐥”, “𝐬𝐮𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐚𝐛𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲” 𝐚𝐧𝐝 “𝐬𝐮𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐚𝐛𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲-𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐤𝐞𝐝” 𝐛𝐨𝐧𝐝.

As of September 30, 2024, the IFSC exchanges boasted a listing of approximately USD 14 billion in ESG-labelled debt securities, a significant chunk of the total USD 64 billion debt listings in a short period. This rapid growth highlights the growing appetite for sustainable investments among global investors.

Certain investors, particularly institutional ones like pension funds and socially responsible investment (SRI) funds, explicitly state in their investment mandates that they can only invest in ESG-labeled securities. To encourage and promote ESG funds, the IFSCA has waived fund filing fees for the first 10 ESG funds registered at GIFT-IFSC, to incentivise fund managers to launch ESG-focused funds.

However, this rapid growth also comes with a significant risk of “greenwashing” where companies or funds exaggerate or falsely claim their environmental and sustainability efforts.

𝐖𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐢𝐬 “𝐆𝐫𝐞𝐞𝐧𝐰𝐚𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐧𝐠”?

However, with this rapid growth comes a significant risk: greenwashing. Greenwashing occurs when companies or funds exaggerate or fabricate their environmental and sustainability efforts to project a greener image and attract investors. It’s essentially a deceptive marketing tactic that undermines the true purpose of sustainable investing.

IFSCA’s Consultation Paper: Mitigating Greenwashing

Recognizing the threat of greenwashing, the IFSCA has released a consultation paper seeking public comment on a draft circular titled “Principles to Mitigate the Risk of Greenwashing in ESG labelled debt securities in the IFSC.” This circular outlines principles that companies and funds issuing ESG-labelled debt securities on the IFSC platform must adhere to.

Refer link for consultation paper: https://ifsca.gov.in/ReportPublication?MId=8kS3KLrLjxk= 

Karnataka, a state in India known for its vibrant tech industry, has recently unveiled its Global Capability Centres (GCC) Policy 2024-2029. This ambitious policy aims to solidify Karnataka’s position as a leading hub for GCCs in India and propel the state’s tech ecosystem to even greater heights.

What are Global Capability Centres (GCCs)?

For those unfamiliar with the term, GCCs are specialized facilities established by companies to handle various strategic functions. These functions can encompass a wide range of areas, including:

• Information Technology (IT) services
• Customer support
• Research and development (R&D)
• Analytics

By setting up GCCs, companies can streamline operations, reduce costs, and tap into a pool of talented professionals. This allows them to achieve their global objectives more efficiently.

Why is Karnataka a Major Hub for GCCs?

India is a powerhouse for GCCs, boasting over 1,300 such centers. Karnataka takes the lead in this domain, housing nearly 30% of India’s GCCs and employing a staggering 35% of the workforce in this sector. Several factors contribute to Karnataka’s attractiveness for GCCs:

• Vast Talent Pool: Karnataka is home to some of India’s premier educational institutions, churning out a steady stream of highly skilled graduates in engineering, technology, and other relevant fields.
• Cost-Effectiveness:India offers a significant cost advantage for setting up and operating GCCs, compared to other global locations.

Key Highlights of Karnataka’s GCC Policy 2024-2029

The recently unveiled GCC Policy outlines a series of ambitious goals and initiatives aimed at propelling Karnataka to the forefront of the global GCC landscape. Here are some of the key highlights:

• Establishment of 500 New GCCs: The policy sets a target of establishing 500 new GCCs in Karnataka by 2029. This aggressive target signifies the government’s commitment to significantly expanding the state’s GCC footprint.
• Generating $50 Billion in Economic Output: The policy envisions generating a staggering $50 billion in economic output through GCCs by 2029. This substantial economic contribution will be a boon for Karnataka’s overall development.
• Creation of 3.5 Lakh Jobs: The policy aims to create 3.5 lakh (350,000) new jobs across Karnataka through the establishment and operation of new GCCs. This significant job creation will provide immense opportunities for the state’s workforce.
• Centre of Excellence for AI in Bengaluru: Recognizing the growing importance of Artificial Intelligence (AI), the policy proposes establishing a Centre of Excellence for AI in Bengaluru. This center will focus on driving research, development, and innovation in the field of AI, fostering a robust AI ecosystem in Karnataka.
• AI Skilling Council: The policy acknowledges the need to equip the workforce with the necessary skills to thrive in the AI-driven future. To address this, the policy proposes the creation of an AI Skilling Council. This council will be responsible for developing and delivering AI-related training programs, ensuring Karnataka’s workforce is well-prepared for the jobs of tomorrow.
• INR 100 Crore Innovation Fund: The policy establishes an INR 100 crore (approximately $12.3 million) Innovation Fund. This fund will support joint research initiatives between academia and GCCs, fostering a collaborative environment that fuels innovation and technological advancements.

The GCC Policy has a clear and ambitious goal: for Karnataka to capture 50% of India’s GCC market share by 2029. Read more about the policy here.

In recent years, a significant number of Indian startups have chosen to incorporate their businesses outside India, primarily in locations like Delaware, Singapore  and other global locations. This trend, known as “flipping,” offered advantages like easier access to foreign capital and tax benefits. However, the tide is starting to turn. We’re witnessing a growing phenomenon of “reverse flipping,” where these startups are now shifting their bases back to India.

This shift back home is driven by several factors, including a booming Indian market, attractive stock market valuations, and a desire to be closer to their target audience – Indian customers. To further incentivize this homecoming, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) has recently introduced a significant policy change.

MCA Streamlines Cross-border Mergers for Reverse Flipping

The MCA has amended the Companies (Compromises, Arrangements, and Amalgamations) Rules, 2016, to streamline the process of cross-border mergers. This move makes it easier for foreign holding companies to merge with their wholly-owned Indian subsidiaries, facilitating a smooth transition for startups seeking to return to their roots.

Key Takeaways of the Amended Rules

Here’s a breakdown of the key benefits for startups considering a reverse flip through this streamlined process:

• Fast-Track Mergers: The Indian subsidiary can file an application under Section 233 read with Rule 25 of the Act. This rule governs “fast-track mergers,” which receive deemed approval if the Central Government doesn’t provide a response within 60 days.
• RBI Approval: Both the foreign holding company and the Indian subsidiary need prior approval from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) for the merger.
• Compliance with Section 233: The Indian subsidiary, acting as the transferee company, must comply with Section 233 of the Companies Act, which outlines the requirements for fast-track mergers.
• No NCLT Clearance Required: This streamlined process eliminates the need for clearance from the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), further reducing time and complexity.

The Road Ahead

The MCA’s move represents a significant positive step for Indian startups looking to return home. This policy change, coupled with a thriving domestic market, is likely to accelerate the trend of reverse flipping. This not only benefits returning companies but also strengthens the overall Indian startup ecosystem, fostering innovation and entrepreneurial growth within the country.

 Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent launch of the IFSCA’s Single Window IT System (SWIT) marks a significant milestone for businesses looking to set up operations in India’s International Financial Services Centre (IFSC) at GIFT City. This unified digital platform promises to revolutionize the ease of doing business in this burgeoning financial hub.

What is the IFSC and Why is SWIT Important?

The International Financial Services Centres Authority (IFSCA) was established to develop a world-class financial center in India. Located in Gujarat’s GIFT City, the IFSC aims to attract international financial institutions and businesses by offering a global standard regulatory environment. However, setting up operations in the IFSC previously involved navigating a complex web of approvals from various regulatory bodies, including IFSCA itself, the SEZ authorities, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), and the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (IRDAI). This process could be time-consuming and cumbersome for businesses.  

SWIT: Streamlining the Application Process

The SWIT platform addresses this challenge by creating a one-stop solution for all approvals required for setting up a business in GIFT IFSC. Here’s how SWIT simplifies the process:

• Single Application Form: Businesses no longer need to submit separate applications to various authorities. SWIT provides a unified form that captures all the necessary information.
• Integrated Approvals: SWIT integrates with relevant regulatory bodies – RBI, SEBI, and IRDAI – for obtaining No Objection Certificates (NOCs) seamlessly.
• SEZ Approval Integration: The platform connects with the SEZ Online System for obtaining approvals from the SEZ authorities managing GIFT City.
• GST Registration: SWIT facilitates easy registration with the Goods and Services Tax (GST) authorities.
• Real-time Validation: The system verifies PAN, Director Identification Number (DIN), and Company Identification Number (CIN) in real-time, ensuring data accuracy.
• Integrated Payment Gateway: Applicants can make payments for various fees and charges directly through the platform.
• Digital Signature Certificate (DSC) Module: The platform enables users to obtain and manage DSCs, a crucial requirement for online submissions.

Benefits of SWIT for Businesses

The introduction of SWIT offers several advantages for businesses considering the IFSC:

• Reduced Time and Cost: By consolidating the application process into a single platform, SWIT significantly reduces the time and cost involved in obtaining approvals. 
• Enhanced Transparency: SWIT provides a transparent and user-friendly interface that allows businesses to track the progress of their applications in real-time. 
• Improved Ease of Doing Business: This makes GIFT City a more attractive proposition for global investors and businesses.

Looking Ahead: The Future of GIFT City

The launch of SWIT is a significant step forward in positioning GIFT City as a leading international financial center. By streamlining the application process and promoting ease of doing business, SWIT paves the way for increased investment and growth in the IFSC. This, in turn, will contribute to India’s ambition of becoming a global financial hub.

In recent years, the global investment landscape has shifted dramatically, with sustainability becoming a central theme in financial markets. As nations and corporations commit to net-zero emissions, innovative financial instruments are emerging to facilitate this transition. One of the most promising of these instruments is Sovereign Green Bonds (SGrBs). Recently, the International Financial Services Centres Authority (IFSCA) in India introduced a scheme for trading and settlement of SGrBs in the Gujarat International Finance Tec-City International Financial Services Centre  (GIFT IFSC), marking a significant step towards attracting foreign investment into the country’s green infrastructure projects.

Understanding Sovereign Green Bonds

SGrBs are debt instruments issued by a government to raise funds specifically for projects that have positive environmental or climate benefits. The proceeds from these bonds are earmarked for green initiatives, such as renewable energy projects, energy efficiency improvements, and sustainable infrastructure development. As global awareness of climate change grows, SGrBs are gaining traction as a viable investment option for those seeking to align their portfolios with sustainable development goals.

The Role of IFSCA

The IFSCA’s initiative to facilitate SGrBs in the GIFT IFSC is a strategic move that aligns with India’s commitment to achieving net-zero emissions by 2070. The GIFT IFSC has been designed as a global financial hub, offering a regulatory environment that supports international business and financial services. By introducing SGrBs, the IFSCA aims to create a robust platform for sustainable finance in India.

Key Features of the IFSCA’s SGrB Scheme

1. Eligible Investors

The IFSCA’s scheme allows a diverse range of investors to participate in the SGrB market. Eligible investors include:

• Non-residents investors from jurisdictions deemed low-risk can invest in these bonds.
• Foreign Banks’ International Banking Units (IBUs): These entities, which do not have a physical presence or business operations in India, can also invest in SGrBs. 

2. Trading and Settlement Platforms: The IFSCA has established electronic platforms through IFSC Exchanges for the trading of SGrBs in primary markets. Moreover, secondary market trading will be facilitated through Over-the-Counter (OTC) markets. 

3. Enhancing Global Capital Inflows: One of the primary objectives of introducing SGrBs in the GIFT IFSC is to enhance global capital inflows into India. With the global community increasingly prioritizing sustainable investment opportunities, India stands to benefit significantly from the influx of foreign capital. The availability of SGrBs provides a unique opportunity for investors looking to contribute to environmental sustainability while achieving financial returns.

The IFSCA’s introduction of SGrBs in the GIFT IFSC is a forward-thinking initiative that aligns with global sustainability goals. By facilitating access for non-resident investors and creating robust trading platforms, India is positioning itself as a leader in sustainable finance. As the world moves toward a greener future, the role of SGrBs will become increasingly important. For investors, these bonds not only represent a chance to achieve financial returns but also to make a meaningful impact on the environment.