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SHA vs SPA vs Subscription Agreement – Guide for Startups & Founders

When a funding round closes in India, three documents sit at the centre of it: the Share Subscription Agreement (SSA), the Share Purchase Agreement (SPA), and the Shareholders’ Agreement (SHA). Each one does a different job, each one carries a different set of risks, and in almost every round, at least one of the three is signed by a founder who has not read it fully. The stakes are higher than they look. The SHA governs your governance rights and exit economics for years after signing. The SSA or SPA determines whether new shares are issued or existing ones change hands, a distinction with direct FEMA and tax consequences. This guide maps the function, structure, negotiation pressure points, and regulatory obligations of all three, so you understand what you are agreeing to before the documents land in your inbox.

What is a Share Subscription Agreement and when is it used?

A Share Subscription Agreement (SSA) is a contract between the company and an investor under which the company agrees to issue fresh shares to the investor in exchange for capital. The company’s paid-up share capital increases. No existing shareholder is selling. The investor receives newly created equity, and the founding team’s ownership percentage dilutes accordingly.

An SSA is the primary investment document for almost every priced equity round in an Indian startup: seed, pre-Series A, Series A, and beyond. The investor subscribes to new shares (almost always Compulsorily Convertible Preference Shares, or CCPS, in institutional rounds), the company gets capital, and the SSA records the terms of that transaction. Because new shares are being created, the SSA triggers a board resolution under Section 62(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013, which requires shareholder approval through a special resolution for preferential allotment to parties other than existing shareholders.

The core contents of a well-drafted SSA are:

  • Number, class, and series of shares being subscribed (equity or CCPS, with conversion terms)
  • Subscription price per share and total investment quantum
  • Conditions Precedent (CPs): what must be done before funds transfer (DD completion, regulatory approvals, AoA amendment, board composition change)
  • Representations and warranties by the company and founders (ownership, litigation, IP, FEMA status)
  • Investor covenants pre-closing
  • Conditions Subsequent (CSs): what must be done after allotment (FC-GPR filing, MCA filings, ESOP pool creation)
  • Indemnity for breach of representations
  • Closing mechanics: wire timeline, share certificate delivery, board resolution sequence

One SSA nuance that frequently surprises first-time founders: when a foreign investor participates in the round, the SSA closing triggers the FC-GPR filing obligation under Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 (NDI Rules). The company has 30 days from the date of share allotment to file Form FC-GPR with its Authorised Dealer bank. Missing this deadline is a compoundable offence under Section 13 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) 1999, with penalties that can reach three times the transaction amount, though in practice compounding orders for technical delays are substantially lower.

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What is a Share Purchase Agreement and when is it used?

A Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) is executed when one party buys existing shares from another party: a founder sells some of their equity to an incoming investor, or an early investor exits to a later-stage fund. The company is not involved except to record and help complete the share transfer. No new shares are created, paid-up capital does not change, and the only movement is ownership from the seller’s column to the buyer’s column on the cap table.

SPAs appear in two distinct contexts in the Indian startup world. The first is a secondary component of a primary round: when the lead investor at Series A puts ₹30 crore into the company as primary subscription via SSA and simultaneously purchases ₹5 crore worth of founder shares as secondary via SPA. The second is a pure secondary transaction: a founder or early investor selling their full stake to a strategic acquirer, a PE fund, or another investor without any new shares being issued.

From a tax standpoint, the SPA triggers capital gains in the hands of the seller. For unlisted shares held over 24 months, the rate is 12.5% long-term capital gains under Section 112 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (as amended by the Finance Act, 2024, effective 23 July 2024). Shares held 24 months or less attract short-term capital gains taxed at the seller’s applicable slab rate, up to 30%. The valuation used in the SPA must comply with Rule 11UA for domestic transactions. For transactions involving a non-resident buyer, the pricing must also comply with FEMA NDI Rules pricing guidelines, typically DCF or a SEBI-approved method, with a Registered Valuer or Chartered Accountant certificate.

The SPA’s most negotiated clauses are:

  • Representations and warranties: the seller makes promises about their clean title to shares, no encumbrances, no SHA transfer restrictions triggered
  • Indemnity cap, basket, and survival period: founders should push for a cap of 10-15% of consideration and 18-24 months survival for general reps, with longer survival only for tax and fundamental reps
  • Conditions Precedent: existing SHA compliance (ROFR waiver, board approval, shareholder consent where required)
  • Escrow holdback provisions: typically 10-20% of consideration held for 12-18 months
  • Non-compete undertaking: duration and geography; keep it narrow, as overly broad non-competes carry enforceability risk under Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872

When a non-resident acquires existing shares from a resident seller, the transaction triggers a Form FC-TRS filing with the AD bank within 60 days of receipt of consideration or transfer of shares, whichever is earlier (NDI Rules, Schedule I, para 9).

What is a Shareholders’ Agreement and what does it actually govern?

The SHA is not a transaction document. It is a governance document. It does not record how shares change hands. It records how shareholders relate to each other and to the company after the transaction closes. The SHA sits alongside the company’s Articles of Association (AoA) as the private contract that governs everything the public constitutional document leaves unspoken.

A typical Indian startup SHA covers:

  • Board composition: number of seats, investor nomination rights, quorum requirements, observer rights
  • Reserved matters: the list of actions the company cannot take without investor consent (new issuances, acquisitions, related party transactions above thresholds, change of business)
  • Anti-dilution rights: the formula (weighted average or full ratchet) and instrument-level triggering events
  • Pre-emption rights: investors’ right to participate pro-rata in future rounds to maintain their ownership percentage
  • Right of First Refusal (ROFR) and Right of First Offer (ROFO): restrictions on founders and investors transferring shares without offering them internally first
  • Tag-along rights: the investor’s right to sell alongside a founder if the founder finds a buyer
  • Drag-along rights: majority’s right to force minority shareholders to sell when a full exit is negotiated
  • Liquidation preference: the order in which sale proceeds are distributed (the most economically consequential clause in the document)
  • Information rights: what financial data the investor receives, at what frequency
  • Founder vesting and lock-in: the schedule under which founder shares vest (reverse vesting) and the lock-in period post-investment
  • Exit mechanics: IPO obligations, put and call options, drag timelines

The SHA is negotiated alongside the SSA. They are usually executed on the same day, often as part of a single closing process. In many early-stage transactions, particularly angel rounds and small institutional rounds, the SSA and SHA are combined into a single document referred to as an SSA-SHA or simply as the SHA. Whether to combine or separate them is a drafting choice that affects how future amendments are handled. A combined document requires all parties to amend together even for changes that affect only the subscription mechanics.

The AoA alignment problem. The SHA’s enforceability has an important structural limit in Indian law. The Supreme Court’s ruling in V.B. Rangaraj v. V.B. Gopalakrishnan (1992) 1 SCC 160 established that restrictions on share transfers in a shareholders’ agreement that are not mirrored in the company’s AoA may not be enforceable against third parties. This means that your ROFR, tag-along, drag-along, and transfer restrictions in the SHA need to be reflected in the AoA to bind parties outside the SHA itself. Investors with experienced counsel will require an AoA amendment as a Condition Precedent in the SSA before funds transfer.

When does a deal use all three agreements: SSA, SPA, and SHA?

Most priced startup rounds use two or three documents depending on whether a secondary component exists.

Primary-only round (SSA + SHA): The investor puts capital into the company. The company issues new shares. This is the standard structure for seed, pre-Series A, and many Series A rounds. Two documents: SSA recording the subscription mechanics, SHA recording the governance framework going forward.

Primary and secondary round (SSA + SPA + SHA): The investor subscribes to new shares from the company via SSA and simultaneously purchases existing shares from a founder or early investor via SPA. Three documents. This structure is common at Series A and B where the investor wants a larger stake than new issuance alone provides, or where a founder or seed investor wants partial liquidity at closing. The SSA and SPA are separate documents because they involve different parties (the company is a party to the SSA but typically only a facilitating party on the SPA), different tax consequences (new share issuance is capital event for the company; secondary sale triggers capital gains for the seller), and different regulatory filings (FC-GPR for SSA, FC-TRS for SPA, if foreign investor).

Pure secondary (SPA + SHA amendment): An existing investor exits fully, and their shares are purchased by a new investor with no new equity issued. The SHA must be amended to remove the exiting investor and add the incoming one, or a new SHA is executed. No SSA is required.

Bold caption: Transaction structure matrix

Round typeSSA neededSPA neededSHA / SHA amendment
Seed (new shares only)YesNoNew SHA
Series A with secondaryYesYesNew SHA or full amendment
Pure secondary exitNoYesSHA amendment to add new investor
Founder buyout of co-founderNoYesSHA amendment
Acqui-hire (asset purchase)NoNoNot applicable
Full acquisition (share purchase)NoYesSHA may terminate on acquisition

How do SSA, SPA, and SHA interact, and what happens when they conflict?

The three documents work in sequence but are negotiated simultaneously, which creates a specific problem: terms agreed at the SHA level sometimes conflict with the mechanics set out in the SSA, or vice versa. The most common inter-document conflict in Indian venture transactions is between the SSA’s representation that “the company has no pending FEMA violations” and the actual state of the company’s regulatory history, which DD then uncovers. When this happens, the representation is either qualified (with a disclosure schedule) or a CP is added requiring remediation before closing.

A more structural conflict arises around anti-dilution. The SSA often records the instrument being issued (say, Series A CCPS with a weighted average anti-dilution). The SHA then sets out the detailed anti-dilution formula and triggering events. If the two documents use different formulas or define “down round” differently, the SHA formula governs post-investment, but the SSA’s characterisation of the instrument may have already been filed with the MCA on Form PAS-3. Amending the CCPS terms post-allotment requires a special resolution and can be operationally difficult.

The hierarchy rule: where the SSA and SHA are separate documents and contain conflicting provisions, most well-drafted SHA templates include an explicit clause providing that the SHA prevails over the SSA in matters of governance and the SSA prevails over the SHA in matters of the subscription transaction itself. Where the two documents are combined, this distinction collapses and conflicts need to be resolved on a case-by-case basis during drafting.

The SPA interacts with the SHA primarily through the ROFR mechanism. Every SHA that contains a ROFR requires the selling shareholder to offer their shares to existing shareholders before approaching a third-party buyer. If a founder signs an SPA with a third party before obtaining ROFR waivers from existing investors, they are in breach of the SHA. This breach can give the investors grounds to challenge the transfer under the specific performance provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

What are the stamp duty obligations on SSA, SPA, and SHA?

This is where most founders and even many lawyers are working from outdated information. The stamp duty landscape for share-related documents has two layers: a centralised layer for the transfer or issuance of securities, and a state layer for the underlying agreements.

Post-1 July 2020 centralisation. The Finance Act, 2019 amended the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 to centralise stamp duty on the transfer of securities. For shares transferred in demat form, stamp duty at 0.015% of the consideration is collected by the depository (CDSL or NSDL) and remitted to the state of the seller’s residence. This centralisation applies to the transfer of securities themselves, not to the underlying agreements.

State-level stamp duty on the agreements (SSA, SPA, SHA) continues to apply separately under state stamp acts. This is the layer that most deals get wrong.

  • SSA: treated as an agreement to subscribe shares. In Maharashtra, SSAs attract stamp duty under Article 25 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, typically 0.20% of the subscription amount, subject to caps. In Karnataka, the stamp duty on agreements is generally ₹2,000. In Delhi, Article 5 of the Indian Stamp Act applies; the Delhi High Court has treated SSAs as agreements with monetary consideration, attracting duty at 0.20% of the value.
  • SPA: treated as a conveyance or agreement to sell. Maharashtra imposes 0.20% on SPAs as instruments creating enforceable monetary rights. Karnataka applies ₹2,000 on agreements unless separately classified as conveyances. Delhi’s treatment has been in flux. A circular from the Delhi State Government in July 2025 clarified stamp duty on share issuance, though the SPA treatment remains governed by existing Article 23 provisions.
  • SHA: treated as an agreement among parties. In Maharashtra, SHAs attract stamp duty that varies based on the consideration embedded in the agreement (reserved matter triggers, put/call option mechanics, and so on). A simple governance SHA without embedded monetary rights typically attracts ₹500 to ₹1,000. Karnataka caps at ₹2,000. Delhi charges ₹100 on standard agreements.

The practical rule: pay stamp duty based on the substance of each document, not the label. An SSA that also contains put/call option mechanics for ROFR will attract higher duty than a purely mechanics-focused SSA. Incorrect stamping makes a document inadmissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act and attracts a penalty of up to 10 times the deficient duty. In Treelife’s transaction work, stamp duty deficiency is flagged in roughly one in four deals reviewed in due diligence.

What FEMA filings does each agreement trigger?

FEMA compliance is not a post-closing formality. It is a condition the agreements themselves create, and the timelines are strict.

SSA with foreign investor (FDI route): The SSA closing triggers the FC-GPR filing. Under the FEMA NDI Rules and RBI Master Direction on Reporting (as updated in 2019 and amended subsequently), the company must file Form FC-GPR with its Authorised Dealer (AD) bank within 30 days of allotment of shares to the non-resident investor. The filing includes the allotment details, the valuation certificate, the FC-GPR form, and the board resolution for allotment. A delay in FC-GPR filing is a compoundable offence under Section 13 of FEMA 1999. Treelife’s experience across 250+ transactions is that FC-GPR delays are the most common post-closing compliance gap, almost always because the CA and the legal counsel each assumed the other was handling it.

SPA with non-resident buyer (secondary sale): The SPA triggers FC-TRS within 60 days of the earlier of the date of transfer of shares or the date of receipt of consideration. FC-TRS is filed with the AD bank and must be accompanied by the SPA, the valuation certificate, and the FIRC (Foreign Inward Remittance Certificate) if consideration has been received. For SPA involving a non-resident seller (existing foreign investor exiting to an Indian buyer), the filing obligation is the same.

SHA: The SHA itself does not trigger a FEMA filing. However, if the SHA’s investor rights (reserved matters, anti-dilution, put/call options) constitute a guarantee or comfort letter from an Indian entity to a foreign shareholder, those provisions need to be structured carefully to avoid triggering external commercial borrowing or derivative instrument rules.

Annual FLA return: Any company that has received FDI (via SSA with a foreign investor) must file the Foreign Liabilities and Assets (FLA) return with the RBI by 15 July of each financial year. Missing the FLA return is an independent FEMA violation, separate from the FC-GPR obligation.

Bold caption: FEMA obligations by agreement type

AgreementFEMA triggerFormDeadlinePenalty for breach
SSA (foreign investor)FDI receipt via allotmentFC-GPR30 days from allotmentUp to 3x transaction value (Section 13, FEMA)
SPA (non-resident buyer)Secondary share transferFC-TRS60 days from transfer/receiptUp to 3x transaction value (Section 13, FEMA)
SPA (non-resident seller)Exit by foreign investorFC-TRS60 days from transfer/receiptUp to 3x transaction value (Section 13, FEMA)
SHANone directlyN/AN/AN/A
Any FDI roundAnnual reportingFLA return15 July each yearCompoundable FEMA violation

Founder negotiation pressure points by document

Most founders negotiate the SHA because it is the document their investors send them (investors draft SHAs in their favour). The SSA and SPA receive less attention because they look more mechanical. This is the wrong allocation of attention. Here is where to push back in each document:

In the SSA

The representations and warranties section is the risk allocation mechanism in the SSA. Founders make representations about the company’s compliance history, ownership structure, IP assignment, and FEMA status. Every representation that is absolute (with no knowledge qualifier) is a potential indemnity trigger if it turns out to be incorrect. Push for knowledge qualifiers on all business-state representations: “to the knowledge of the founders and the company” on anything that is not a verifiable fact from a public register. Fundamental representations (authority to enter the agreement, authorised share capital, absence of injunctions) typically cannot be knowledge-qualified and should not be.

Conditions Precedent deserve careful reading. CPs that require “all approvals” without specifying which approvals can be used to delay closing indefinitely if an investor’s relationship sours between term sheet and signing. Name every required approval explicitly.

In the SPA

Indemnity caps, baskets, and survival periods are the three parameters that determine your actual exposure as a seller. An uncapped indemnity with a 7-year survival period on a secondary sale of ₹10 crore of shares could cost you far more than ₹10 crore in liability if undisclosed issues surface. The market standard in Indian venture transactions: indemnity cap at 10-15% of consideration, basket (de minimis threshold before indemnity kicks in) at 0.5-1% of consideration, general rep survival at 18-24 months, tax rep survival at the relevant limitation period plus a buffer.

Non-compete clauses in SPAs are often written too broadly. An Indian court will not enforce an unreasonably wide non-compete under Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Push back on scope beyond your actual role and geography, and keep duration to 2 years maximum.

In the SHA

The three clauses that have the most material impact on your economics at exit: liquidation preference (1x non-participating versus 1x participating), anti-dilution formula (weighted average versus full ratchet), and drag-along threshold (the percentage that can force a sale). Full ratchet anti-dilution means that in a down round, the investor’s entire position reprices as if they had invested at the lower price. This can leave founders with effectively no economics at exit even in a moderate down scenario. Weighted average anti-dilution is the market standard and significantly more founder-friendly. Document every push-back and track what you concede and why, so that future rounds do not extend concessions you never intended to make permanently.

Reviewing an SHA, SSA, or SPA before you sign? Let’s Talk

Common mistakes that cost founders time and money

Mistake 1: Signing an SPA without obtaining the ROFR waiver first. The SHA’s ROFR mechanism requires the selling shareholder to offer their shares to existing shareholders before selling to a third party. Founders who sign an SPA with a buyer, then seek ROFR waivers, are already in breach of the SHA at the moment of signing. The correct sequence is: identify buyer, obtain SHA-compliant ROFR waivers or ROFO exercise periods, then execute the SPA.

Mistake 2: Missing the FC-GPR 30-day deadline after foreign investor closing. The 30-day clock runs from allotment, not from when the money hits the bank. Allotment happens at the board meeting where shares are formally allocated. If that meeting precedes the fund transfer (which it sometimes does when wire timelines are tight), the clock is already running. Set a compliance reminder at the board meeting itself, not at fund receipt.

Mistake 3: Failing to align the SHA with the AoA. Founders and investors execute an SHA with detailed ROFR, tag-along, and drag-along provisions, then continue operating under an AoA that does not reflect those provisions. The V.B. Rangaraj ruling means that transfer restrictions in the SHA that are not in the AoA may not bind third parties. The fix: always amend the AoA simultaneously with executing the SHA, and treat this as a Condition Precedent in the SSA rather than a Condition Subsequent.

Mistake 4: Accepting unlimited or very long indemnity survival periods on representations in the SPA or SSA. Most templates sent by investor counsel have survival periods of 7-10 years for tax representations. Practical compounding under the Income Tax Act, 1961 is typically 6 years from the end of the relevant assessment year, plus one year. A survival period beyond the applicable limitation period creates exposure without a corresponding regulatory rationale. Under the Income Tax Act, 2025 (which replaced the 1961 Act from 1 April 2026), the practical limitation period for most tax assessments is 6 years from the end of the relevant tax year. Push for parity with this period.

Mistake 5: Not reading the SHA’s reserved matters list carefully. Reserved matters require investor consent before the company acts. Lists that are too broad (covering routine decisions like entering into contracts above ₹5 lakhs or hiring anyone above a certain salary) can make the company operationally paralysed. Every item on the reserved matters list should pass the test: is this genuinely a significant enough action that an investor with a minority stake deserves a veto? If not, remove it.

Case study

Situation: Pre-Series A B2B SaaS startup, Bengaluru. Two co-founders. Had raised ₹4 crore from four angel investors, two of whom were US-based NRIs, in FY2022-23.

Challenge: FC-GPR had never been filed for the NRI angels’ investments. SHA had ROFR and tag-along provisions not mirrored in the AoA. Series B term sheet required clean FEMA status as a Condition Precedent.

What Treelife did: Filed two belated FC-GPR applications through the AD bank with LSF calculations. Ran an EGM to pass a special resolution amending the AoA to mirror SHA transfer restrictions. Prepared regulatory opinion confirming remediation for investor’s legal counsel.

Outcome: Both FC-GPR filings cleared in 9 weeks. AoA amendment completed in 3 weeks. Series A closed on schedule. Total regularisation cost: ₹1.8 lakhs in LSF and ROC fees. Investor’s legal counsel accepted Treelife’s compliance confirmation letter without requiring a full secretarial audit.

Frequently asked questions

Q: What is the difference between an SSA and a subscription agreement?
A: They refer to the same document. “Share Subscription Agreement” and “subscription agreement” are used interchangeably in the Indian startup context. In some transactions, particularly those involving convertible instruments or SAFE-like structures, the document may be called a “subscription and conversion agreement” to reflect the two-stage nature of the investment. The function is the same: it records the terms on which the investor subscribes to new shares issued by the company.

Q: Do I need an SHA if I have an SSA?
A: Almost always, yes. The SSA covers the mechanics of the investment transaction. It does not cover the ongoing governance of the company post-investment: board rights, reserved matters, anti-dilution, ROFR, tag-along, drag-along, or exit mechanics. Without an SHA, there is no private agreement governing investor-founder relations after the shares are allotted. Some angel-level transactions run with SSAs only and loose letters of intent for governance, but this creates enforcement ambiguity in any future dispute.

Q: Can the SSA and SHA be combined into one document?
A: Yes. Many Indian early-stage rounds execute a single combined SSA-SHA document. The advantage is simplicity and a single reference point. The disadvantage is that any future amendment, even to only one of the two components, requires all parties to sign. In rounds with multiple investors, unanimous amendment is harder to achieve than a separate SSA amendment or separate SHA amendment.

Q: What stamp duty should I pay on an SHA in Maharashtra?
A: An SHA in Maharashtra attracts stamp duty under Article 25 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958. For a purely governance SHA with no embedded monetary rights, duty is typically ₹500 to ₹2,000. Where the SHA contains put/call option mechanics, liquidation preferences with quantified floors, or other instruments that create directly enforceable monetary rights, the document is assessed on its substance and can attract duty at 0.20% of the embedded consideration. Pay via e-stamping and retain the stamping receipt as part of the deal file.

Q: What happens if the SSA closes with a foreign investor and I miss the 30-day FC-GPR deadline?
A: Missing the FC-GPR deadline is a compoundable FEMA contravention under Section 13 of FEMA 1999. The company must file a belated FC-GPR through its AD bank. The AD bank will calculate a Late Submission Fee (LSF) based on the duration of delay and the transaction amount. In practice, for technical delays on FC-GPR (as opposed to structural FEMA violations), the LSF is manageable, but the process takes 8-10 weeks, which can delay your next fundraise if the existing violation surfaces in DD.

Q: Does a domestic SPA require any regulatory filing?
A: A domestic secondary sale (resident seller to resident buyer, private company shares) does not require an RBI or SEBI filing. The company must update its statutory register of members under the Companies Act, 2013, file Form SH-4 (share transfer form) with the relevant stamp duty paid, and update its cap table records. The MCA form PAS-3 is not required for a transfer of existing shares; it is only required on allotment of new shares.

Q: If a co-founder exits and we buy their shares via SPA, does the SHA need to be amended?
A: Yes. The exiting co-founder is likely a party to the existing SHA. Their exit from the cap table should be reflected in the SHA by way of a deed of retirement or a formal SHA amendment removing them as a party and confirming that any residual obligations (non-compete, confidentiality, IP assignment) remain in force per the terms of the SPA. Failing to formally retire the exiting co-founder from the SHA creates a risk that they retain technical party status and information rights under the document.

Q: Can a DPIIT-recognised startup use a convertible note instead of an SSA?
A: Yes. DPIIT-recognised startups can issue convertible notes to investors under Section 62(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 read with the FEMA NDI Rules, 2019 (for foreign investors). Convertible notes are a debt instrument with the option to convert to equity. The minimum investment per investor is ₹25 lakhs and the maximum tenure is 10 years. The DPIIT Startup India notification of 4 February 2026 raised the turnover threshold for standard startup recognition from ₹100 crore to ₹200 crore (the 10-year recognition period is retained). An SSA is not used for convertible note issuance; the instrument is a Convertible Note Agreement. The SHA, if any, governs the note holder’s rights post-conversion.

Q: What happens to the SHA if the company is acquired?
A: Most SHAs contain a drag-along provision that allows a majority (threshold negotiated, typically 75% of all investor-held shares plus founder consent, or some variation) to force remaining shareholders to sell on the same terms as the drag-along sale. On a full acquisition via SPA, the SHA typically terminates on closing. This is often expressed as a survival clause in the SHA itself, listing which provisions survive closing (confidentiality, non-compete, specific indemnities) and which terminate. Founders should verify the survival clause before signing.

Q: Does an NRI founder who is a party to the SHA need to comply with FEMA?
A: This depends on the NRI’s FEMA residential status. An NRI (non-resident Indian) holds shares in an Indian company on a repatriation or non-repatriation basis. The SHA itself does not trigger FEMA obligations. If the NRI founder’s shareholding changes (through buyback, secondary sale, or bonus issuance), FEMA pricing and reporting obligations apply depending on the mode of change. An NRI selling shares to a resident Indian triggers FC-TRS just as a foreign investor’s sale would.

Q: What is the correct sequence for executing SSA, SPA, and SHA in a round that has all three?
A: The standard sequencing in Indian practice: (1) Conditions Precedent are confirmed complete by both sides, including AoA amendment, ROFR waivers on secondary shares, and due diligence sign-off; (2) SSA, SPA, and SHA are executed simultaneously on the same closing date; (3) share allotment (for SSA) and share transfer (for SPA) are completed by board resolution within 15-30 days of execution; (4) FC-GPR is filed within 30 days of allotment and FC-TRS within 60 days of transfer, if foreign investor; (5) PAS-3 is filed with the MCA within 30 days of allotment for new shares.

Q: What is the difference between tag-along and drag-along in an SHA, and which one protects founders?
A: Tag-along is an investor protection. If a founder sells their shares to a buyer, the investor has the right to tag along and sell their own shares to the same buyer at the same price and terms. This protects investors from being left behind in a founder exit. Drag-along is a majority-shareholder mechanism. If the majority (above a negotiated threshold) wants to sell to a buyer, they can force the minority shareholders to sell on the same terms. Drag-along can work in a founder’s favour, allowing a majority sale to proceed without a minority holdout, but it can also be used against a founder if investor-held shares constitute the majority. Founders should negotiate the drag-along threshold carefully: the higher the threshold, the harder it is to use the drag against you.

Q: How long does it take to negotiate and execute SSA, SPA, and SHA from term sheet to closing?
A: For a mid-complexity Series A round (domestic investor, no secondary component, straightforward FEMA history), 8-10 weeks from term sheet to closing is realistic. Add 4-6 weeks for a secondary component requiring SPA and ROFR waiver processes. Add 6-12 weeks if there are FEMA remediation items (belated FC-GPR, FLA returns, compounding applications). Pure documentation turnaround on the three agreements (assuming clean due diligence) is 3-4 weeks once the first drafts are exchanged. The timeline is almost always driven by due diligence findings and regulatory remediation, not by drafting speed.

Regulatory references

  • Companies Act, 2013: Section 62(1)(c) (preferential allotment, shareholder approval); Section 62(1)(b) (ESOP shareholder approval); Section 27 (Indian Contract Act, 1872, non-compete enforceability)
  • Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA), 1999: Section 13 (penalty for contravention)
  • Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 (NDI Rules): Schedule I, para 9 (FC-TRS timelines); FC-GPR 30-day filing requirement
  • RBI Master Direction on Reporting under FEMA, 2019 (as amended): FC-GPR and FC-TRS reporting obligations
  • Income Tax Act, 1961 / Income Tax Act, 2025 (effective 1 April 2026, renumbered but substantively unchanged): Section 112 under the 1961 Act (LTCG on unlisted shares at 12.5%, effective 23 July 2024 via Finance Act, 2024); Rule 11UA (valuation for unlisted shares in domestic transactions)
  • Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (as amended by Finance Act, 2019, centralised stamp duty on securities effective 1 July 2020)
  • Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958: Article 25 (agreements)
  • V.B. Rangaraj v. V.B. Gopalakrishnan (1992) 1 SCC 160 (AoA-SHA alignment and enforceability of transfer restrictions)
  • Companies Act, 2013: Section 58 (recognition of transfer restrictions in AoA for private companies)

External sources

Co-founder disputes in Indian startups: legal options, buyout mechanics & SHA

When a co-founder dispute surfaces in an Indian startup, the outcome is rarely decided in a boardroom or a court. It is decided by whatever was written into the shareholders’ agreement six months or two years before the relationship broke down. Founders who go into a dispute with a well-drafted SHA have leverage, a clear path, and a predictable timeline. Founders who go in with a generic template or nothing at all find themselves in a valuation fight, a Section 241 petition, or an injunction that freezes a funding round. The pattern across hundreds of founder transactions is consistent: the documents written at incorporation determine the cost of every conflict that follows.

What actually triggers a co-founder dispute: legal event, not a people problem

Four patterns account for the majority of co-founder disputes Treelife sees in live mandates. None of them start as legal problems. All of them become legal problems.

  • The undocumented sweat equity claim – A founder contributes product, early sales, or operational work on the basis of a verbal promise. The paperwork, if any, shows a consulting agreement. When the company converts or raises a round, the equity is not there. The verbal promise is now a shadow equity claim under contract law. Courts will examine email chains, WhatsApp messages, and any written communication that suggests a promise was made. If the equity was not explicitly ruled out in writing, the claim survives.
  • The dormant cap table – Multiple early contributors were added with an equal-split handshake. One went passive, another moved abroad. When a Series A term sheet arrives, those names are still on the register. They have not signed any vesting schedule. They have pre-emptive rights and anti-dilution protection. What looked like a 25% stake now creates a 50% problem.
  • The unassigned IP – An early product was built with a friend’s agency or a freelancer who never invoiced. No IP assignment agreement was signed. The company is now in acquisition due diligence and the acquirer’s lawyers have found the gap. The friend wants advisory equity. The acquirer wants representations. The founders have neither.
  • The misaligned exit – One founder begins exploring an acquisition. The other finds out from a LinkedIn post. The second founder is not aligned on valuation, future role, or deal structure. The acquirer walks. The relationship ends. A Section 241 petition under the Companies Act, 2013 is filed alleging oppression.

Each of these is preventable. Each becomes expensive once the dispute is live because the legal system then fills in whatever the SHA left blank, usually in ways neither party wanted.

The SHA clauses that determine your position before any dispute is filed

This is where founders systematically underinvest. Most SHA templates circulating in the Indian startup ecosystem cover equity split and anti-dilution. They leave the dispute-critical clauses either vague or absent. The table below maps what each clause does and what happens when it is missing.

Table 1: SHA clauses and their dispute impact

SHA clauseWhat it doesIf the SHA is silent
Vesting schedule with cliffEquity accrues over time (typically 4 years, 1-year cliff). Unvested shares revert to the company on exit.Exiting founder retains full equity regardless of contribution. Company cannot dilute without their consent.
Exit valuation formulaSpecifies how buyout price is calculated (DCF, book value, independent CA, multiple of revenue).Valuation fight defaults to Rule 11UA under Income Tax Rules 1962, which may not reflect company reality.
Deadlock resolution mechanismDefines what happens when founders cannot agree on a reserved matter (Russian roulette clause, casting vote, or third-party decision-maker).No mechanism exists. Company is paralysed. NCLT intervention or dissolution becomes the only path.
Drag-along rightsMajority shareholder can compel minority to sell in an acquisition on the same terms.Minority co-founder can block or delay any M&A transaction.
Tag-along rightsMinority shareholder can participate in any sale on the same terms as majority.Minority is exposed to being left behind in a secondary sale.
IP assignment clauseAll IP created by founders is assigned to the company at incorporation.IP ownership sits with the individual founder. Acquirers flag this as a deal-breaker in due diligence.
Non-compete scopeDefines geography, duration, and activity restriction post-exit.Exiting co-founder can immediately join or build a competitor. Enforcement under Section 27, Indian Contract Act 1872 is contested (see below).
Forced transfer triggerSpecifies events that require a founder to sell their shares (misconduct, breach, prolonged absence).Removing a non-performing or hostile co-founder requires NCLT petition or negotiated agreement, both of which are slow and costly.

One point on non-compete clauses specifically: Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 renders agreements in restraint of trade void. Indian courts have taken varying positions on whether post-exit non-competes in founder agreements are enforceable. The safer approach is to anchor the restriction to protection of confidential information and trade secrets rather than a blanket prohibition on competing activity. Treelife recommends pairing the non-compete with a robust confidentiality clause and an IP assignment clause, which together achieve the commercial objective without the Section 27 vulnerability.

How does a co-founder buyout actually get priced in India?

Valuation is where most co-founder buyouts collapse. The SHA said “fair market value” without defining it. Now two founders with opposing interests are arguing about what the company is worth.

Indian law provides a default mechanism: Rule 11UA of the Income Tax Rules, 1962. This rule prescribes the methods for determining fair market value of unquoted equity shares for the purposes of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The two primary methods under Rule 11UA are the net asset value (NAV) method and the discounted cash flow (DCF) method. For a pre-revenue or early-stage startup, NAV typically produces a lower number than DCF. For a profitable company, the gap can be reversed.

The problem is that Rule 11UA was designed for tax compliance, not for equitable buyout pricing between founders. An early-stage SaaS startup with Rs. 2 crore in ARR and Rs. 50 lakh in net assets will produce a vastly different valuation under NAV vs DCF, and a departing co-founder will instinctively gravitate toward whichever produces the higher number.

Rule 11UA, Income Tax Rules, 1962 governs fair market value determination for unquoted equity share transfers. For transfers between resident co-founders, the applicable methods are NAV and DCF. The angel tax provision under Section 56(2)(viib) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which had historically driven Rule 11UA scrutiny for startup share issuances, was abolished with effect from 01/04/2025 by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2024. It is no longer relevant to domestic co-founder transactions. Where either party to the transfer is a non-resident, five additional valuation methods apply under the CBDT Notification No. 81/2023 amendment to Rule 11UA (Comparable Company Multiple, PWERM, Option Pricing, Milestone Analysis, Replacement Cost), and a Category I Merchant Banker must typically certify the valuation.

What should the SHA say on valuation?

Three approaches, in order of robustness:

Option 1: Independent valuer with defined methodology. Specify that valuation shall be conducted by a Category I Merchant Banker or a Chartered Accountant registered under the ICAI, using a named methodology (typically DCF for growth-stage, NAV for early-stage), with a defined timeline (say, 30 days from the trigger event) and cost split between the parties.

Option 2: Formula-based valuation. For businesses with predictable revenue, specify a revenue multiple or EBITDA multiple as the floor, with DCF as the ceiling. This narrows the range of the valuation fight even if it does not eliminate it.

Option 3: Russian roulette or shotgun clause. One founder names a price. The other founder must either buy at that price or sell at that price. This is blunt but efficient. It incentivises the offering founder to name a fair price because they do not know which side of the transaction they will end up on. Courts in India have upheld Russian roulette clauses where they were clearly drafted and the parties had legal representation at the time of execution.

If the SHA is silent on valuation, and the parties cannot agree, the default legal outcome is either a negotiated settlement under threat of NCLT, or an independent expert appointed by the NCLT under Section 242, Companies Act, 2013. Both are slower and more expensive than any contractual mechanism.

Which legal path fits your situation?

Not every co-founder dispute requires litigation. Not every dispute can be resolved without it. The table below maps the four available paths against the scenarios where each is appropriate.

Table 2: Legal paths for co-founder disputes in India

PathWhat triggers itRealistic timelineWhat it achievesWhat it cannot do
Negotiated exitBoth parties willing to talk4-12 weeksClean separation, agreed price, confidentialDoes not work if one party is hostile or using delay as leverage
Arbitration (Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996)Arbitration clause in SHA6-18 months (institutional); 12-36 months (ad hoc)Binding award, confidential, enforceableCannot grant company law remedies (directorship removal, share allotment disputes)
NCLT petition under Section 241/242, Companies Act, 2013Oppression or mismanagement by majority12-36 monthsCan order share buyback, reconstitute board, wind up companyRequires genuine oppression threshold; cannot be used for simple disagreements
Section 9 interim injunction (Arbitration Act, 1996)Imminent irreparable harm during arbitration2-6 weeks for hearingFreezes a transaction, preserves status quoTemporary only; requires strong prima facie case

When does a Section 241 petition actually work?

Section 241 of the Companies Act, 2013 allows a member holding at least 10% of the issued share capital (or such lower percentage as the Central Government may prescribe for small companies) to petition the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) on grounds of oppression or mismanagement. Where a founder has been diluted below 10% through subsequent funding rounds, the NCLT retains discretion to waive this threshold under Section 244(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 in exceptional circumstances, as established in the Cyrus Investments/Tata Sons line of precedent. The threshold is therefore a starting point, not an absolute bar, for a genuinely aggrieved minority founder. The threshold for oppression itself is not merely disagreement. Courts and the NCLT look for conduct that is burdensome, harsh, and wrongful: unfair dilution without consent, exclusion from board decisions, diversion of company funds, or removal of a director without following due process under Section 169 of the Companies Act, 2013.

Founders who file Section 241 petitions as a tactical move to delay a fundraise or acquisition typically find that the NCLT examines whether the petitioner’s own conduct was clean. A co-founder who stopped attending board meetings, stopped meeting vesting milestones, or who has competing business interests will face a harder case before the NCLT regardless of how the majority treated them.

When is a Section 9 injunction the right move?

If a hostile co-founder is about to execute a share transfer, sign a contract on behalf of the company without authorisation, or participate in an M&A transaction that you believe violates your SHA rights, a Section 9 application under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 can seek interim relief from the competent court within days. The court will consider whether there is a prima facie case, whether the balance of convenience favours the applicant, and whether irreparable harm would result without the injunction.

The practical risk: if you are the target of a Section 9 application and the court grants the injunction, your M&A transaction is frozen. Acquirers in India increasingly walk away from transactions where founder litigation risk surfaces mid-process. Use this path judiciously.

What changes if your entity is an LLP, not a Pvt Ltd?

Most startup dispute content assumes a private limited company structure. A meaningful number of early-stage ventures and professional services startups are LLPs. The legal framework is different.

Under the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008, partner exits and disputes are governed primarily by the LLP agreement. The NCLT has jurisdiction over LLP disputes under certain provisions, but the oppression and mismanagement framework under Sections 241/242 of the Companies Act, 2013 does not directly apply to LLPs. Dissolution of an LLP can be ordered by the tribunal under Section 64 of the LLP Act, 2008 on grounds including just and equitable winding up.

Arbitration remains available and effective for LLPs, provided the LLP agreement includes an arbitration clause. Statutory filings on partner changes are made via Form 4 with the Registrar of Companies (as opposed to Form DIR-12 and Form SH-4 for Pvt Ltds).

If your startup is structured as an LLP and a co-founder dispute is developing, the resolution path is faster but the statutory protection is narrower. Converting to a Pvt Ltd before a dispute escalates is worth considering, though it requires compliance under the Companies Act, 2013 and MCA approval.

Working through a co-founder dispute or want to stress-test. Let’s Talk

The tax consequences nobody warns you about

A co-founder buyout is, in tax terms, a share transfer. The tax treatment depends on the structure of the transaction.

Capital gains on share transfer. When the exiting co-founder sells their unlisted startup shares, the gain is taxed as capital gains. Unlisted shares qualify as long-term capital assets if held for more than 24 months. Long-term capital gain on unlisted shares is taxed at 12.5% without indexation under Section 112 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, following the revision introduced by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2024 with effect from 23/07/2024. The earlier 20% with indexation option under Section 112 no longer applies to transfers after that date. Section 112A, which carries a 12.5% concessional rate, applies only to listed equity shares, equity-oriented mutual funds, and business trust units where Securities Transaction Tax has been paid. It does not apply to unlisted startup shares. Short-term capital gain on shares held under 24 months is taxed at the applicable slab rate. For a founder who has held shares since incorporation and is exiting at a later-stage valuation, this liability can be significant and must be modelled before agreeing on a buyout price.

Company buyback. If the company buys back the exiting founder’s shares rather than another founder purchasing them, the tax position changed materially from 01/10/2024. Section 115QA of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (which previously required the company to pay buyback distribution tax at an effective rate of 23.296%) no longer applies to buybacks executed on or after 01/10/2024. Under the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2024, buyback proceeds are now treated as deemed dividend under the newly inserted Section 2(22)(f) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and taxed in the hands of the shareholder as income from other sources at applicable slab rates. No deduction is permitted for the cost of acquiring the shares. The shareholder records a capital loss (cost of shares less nil deemed consideration) which can only be set off against other capital gains, not against income. For a founder in the 30% tax bracket, this treatment is materially more expensive than the pre-October 2024 regime. The company is required to deduct TDS at 10% for resident shareholders at the time of buyback. Always model this tax consequence before choosing a buyback structure over a peer-to-peer share transfer.

ESOP-holding co-founders. If the exiting co-founder holds ESOPs rather than directly allotted shares, the tax event occurs at two points: perquisite tax at the time of exercise (as salary income under Section 17(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961) and capital gains tax on eventual sale. Unvested options generally lapse on exit as per the company’s ESOP plan. The SHA should cross-reference the ESOP plan on this point to avoid a separate dispute.

GST. Share transfers between residents are generally not subject to GST. Monetary settlements characterised as service fees or consultancy payments may attract GST. Structure matters here.

Common mistakes that cost founders the most in a dispute

Treating the founders’ agreement as a formality at incorporation. The SHA is signed under time pressure, usually in the week of incorporation or the week before a first investor meeting. The valuation clause says “fair market value,” the exit clause says “as mutually agreed,” and the IP assignment is in a separate document that nobody follows up on. These gaps cost nothing at signing and everything in a dispute.

Letting equity sit on the cap table without vesting. A co-founder who is no longer active in the business but holds 20-25% without any cap table vesting mechanism has no legal obligation to sell, no reason to approve dilution, and every incentive to hold out for a premium. A four-year vesting schedule with a one-year cliff, drafted at inception, would have addressed this entirely.

Filing NCLT as a first move. Section 241 is a blunt instrument. It is public, slow, and signals to every investor and acquirer that the company’s governance is under judicial scrutiny. Founders who use it as leverage before attempting negotiation or mediation typically find that the process costs more than the dispute itself was worth, and that the company’s valuation suffers in the interim.

Ignoring the tax structure of the buyout. Two founders agree on an exit price of Rs. 5 crore. Nobody has modelled the capital gains liability, the buyback tax if the company is the buyer, or the GST on any advisory fee payment. The exiting founder discovers post-signing that Rs. 1.2 crore of the Rs. 5 crore goes to tax. The deal sours and sometimes unravels.

Not notifying investors before the exit is executed. Most SHA templates include an investor information right or a consent right for co-founder exits above a certain share threshold. Executing an exit without investor notification is a breach of the SHA. Investors who find out post-facto may invoke other SHA rights or withhold further tranches.

Treelife practitioner note

In the SHA and dispute mandates we have handled at Treelife, the most consistent pattern is not the absence of an agreement. It is the presence of a generic agreement that was never stress-tested against the actual founder relationship.

We routinely see SHA templates that have four-year vesting and a one-year cliff but define “cause” for accelerated vesting so broadly that it is unenforceable. We see deadlock clauses that specify mediation, then arbitration, then “as the board may decide”, without specifying who decides when the board itself is deadlocked. We see IP assignment clauses that cover future IP but not IP already built before incorporation, which is precisely where the dispute starts.

The exercise we run for every founder client before any dispute surfaces is a scenario stress test: we take the SHA and run three hypotheticals through it: one founder resigns, one founder is asked to leave, an acquisition offer comes in at 5x. In most cases, the agreement is silent on at least one critical point in each scenario. The cost of fixing this before a dispute is a few hours of legal review. The cost of addressing it after a dispute is typically a multiple of the company’s last-round valuation in legal fees, delay, and lost deals.

The SHA is not the document that starts a company. It is the document that determines what happens when the company starts becoming valuable, or starts falling apart. Those two events often arrive closer together than founders expect.

Case study

Situation: Series A SaaS startup, Bengaluru. Three co-founders held equal equity with no vesting schedule. One founder became passive after a personal health issue eighteen months post-incorporation.

Challenge: Active founders wanted to dilute passive founder’s stake before the Series A close. Passive founder refused consent. Investor term sheet had a 60-day exclusivity window. No deadlock mechanism in SHA.

What Treelife did: Negotiated a buyout structure using an independent CA valuation under Rule 11UA, drafted an exit agreement with a 24-month non-compete anchored to confidentiality obligations rather than a blanket trade restraint, and structured the consideration as a staggered payment tied to the Series A close to manage cash flow.

Outcome: Exit executed in 38 days. Series A closed within the exclusivity window. Passive founder received a price 1.4x the Rule 11UA NAV figure. No litigation.

FAQs on Co-Founder Disputes in India

Q: Can a co-founder be removed without their consent in India?
A: Not unilaterally, unless the SHA has a forced transfer trigger clause and the triggering event has occurred. A director can be removed by ordinary resolution under Section 169 of the Companies Act, 2013 with special notice, but removal as a director does not affect share ownership. Equity can only be compulsorily transferred if the SHA expressly provides for it and the prescribed process is followed. Without such a clause, the company must negotiate a buyout or petition the NCLT.

Q: Is a verbal promise of equity enforceable in India?
A: Verbal agreements are technically contracts under the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The difficulty is proof. Courts will examine email threads, WhatsApp messages, meeting minutes, and any written communication that corroborates the oral promise. A verbal promise is not automatically unenforceable, but it is substantially harder to establish and the outcome is uncertain. Get any equity arrangement into writing, even an informal MoU, before work begins.

Q: What happens to unvested equity when a co-founder exits?
A: Under a properly drafted vesting schedule, unvested shares revert to the company upon exit. The SHA should specify whether reversion is at face value or at nil consideration, and the mechanism for the actual share transfer back. If the SHA is silent, unvested equity technically remains with the exiting founder absent a specific contractual provision requiring return.

Q: Can I file a Section 241 petition just to freeze a deal I disagree with?
A: Section 241 of the Companies Act, 2013 requires genuine oppression or mismanagement, not mere disagreement on strategy. The NCLT has consistently held that the petitioner must demonstrate conduct that is burdensome, harsh, and wrongful. Using it purely as a tactical delay mechanism is likely to fail and may expose the petitioner to costs. A Section 9 injunction under the Arbitration Act is a faster and more targeted tool if the issue is a specific pending transaction.

Q: How long does an NCLT co-founder dispute take to resolve?
A: NCLT timelines in practice range from 18 months to 36 months for a contested petition, though interim relief (such as staying a share transfer or board decision) can be obtained within weeks of filing. The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) adds further time if a party appeals. Arbitration, by contrast, typically runs 12-24 months for institutional arbitration under the ICADR or DIAC rules.

Q: What is the tax on a co-founder buyout?
A: If the exiting co-founder sells unlisted startup shares held for more than 24 months, the gain is taxed as long-term capital gain at 12.5% without indexation under Section 112 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (revised rate from 23/07/2024). Section 112A does not apply to unlisted shares. Short-term gains on shares held under 24 months are taxed at slab rate. If the company buys back shares rather than a peer transfer, buyback proceeds are treated as deemed dividend under Section 2(22)(f) and taxed at the shareholder’s slab rate, with no deduction for cost of acquisition permitted (effective from 01/10/2024). Always model the tax before agreeing on a buyout price and structure.

Q: Does arbitration work for co-founder disputes in India?
A: Yes, provided the SHA includes a clear arbitration clause specifying the seat, the rules (ICADR, DIAC, or ICC), the number of arbitrators, and the governing law. Indian courts have consistently upheld arbitration clauses in shareholder agreements and will refer parties to arbitration when one party attempts to litigate in civil court. The advantage of arbitration is confidentiality and speed relative to litigation. The limitation is that arbitration cannot grant company law-specific remedies such as directorship reconstitution or compulsory share buyback; those require NCLT.

Q: Can a Section 9 injunction stop a funding round or acquisition?
A: Yes. A Section 9 application under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 can seek a stay on share transfers, execution of agreements, or any transaction that would cause irreparable harm to the applicant pending arbitration. Courts have granted such injunctions to freeze M&A processes where a founder established a prima facie case of SHA violation. The risk to the company is significant: acquirers and investors routinely exit processes where founder litigation is visible.

Q: What is a Russian roulette clause and is it enforceable in India?
A: A Russian roulette or shotgun clause requires one founder to name a share price, after which the other founder must either buy at that price or sell at that price. It is an effective deadlock breaker because it incentivises fair pricing. Indian courts have upheld Russian roulette clauses where they were clearly drafted and the parties had independent legal representation at execution. The clause should specify the timeline for exercising the option, the payment mechanism, and what happens if neither party has the liquidity to buy.

Q: What filings are required when a co-founder exits a Pvt Ltd?
A: For a director resignation, Form DIR-12 must be filed with the Registrar of Companies within 30 days of the date of cessation. For share transfer, Form SH-4 (share transfer deed) must be executed and the company’s register of members updated. Annual filings (MGT-7 and AOC-4) must reflect the updated shareholding. Failure to file within prescribed timelines attracts penalties under the Companies Act, 2013.

Q: Does FEMA apply to a co-founder buyout where one founder is an NRI or foreign national?
A: Yes. If either party to the share transfer is a non-resident Indian or a foreign national, the transaction is subject to FEMA 1999 and the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019. Pricing must comply with the prescribed valuation norms for foreign investment transactions. The AD (Authorised Dealer) bank must be involved in the remittance. Failure to comply with FEMA can result in penalties of up to three times the amount involved under Section 13 of FEMA 1999.

Q: Can the company be wound up because of a co-founder dispute?
A: Yes, in extreme cases. The NCLT can order winding up on “just and equitable” grounds under Section 271(e) of the Companies Act, 2013 if the company’s substratum has disappeared or if the relationship between founders has broken down to the point where the company cannot be managed. Courts treat this as a last resort. In most cases where winding up is threatened, the NCLT instead orders a buyout of the petitioner’s shares at fair value under Section 242.

Q: How does a co-founder dispute affect an ongoing fundraise?
A: Immediately and materially. Investors conduct diligence on the founding team as rigorously as on the business. Any pending litigation, NCLT petition, or unresolved equity claim on the cap table will surface in diligence. Most institutional investors will not proceed to term sheet execution until the dispute is resolved or ring-fenced. A Section 9 injunction on the company’s shares can make a fundraise legally impossible until the stay is vacated.

Regulatory references:

  • Companies Act, 2013: Sections 169, 241, 242, 244, 271
  • Indian Contract Act, 1872: Section 27
  • Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: Sections 9, 34
  • Income Tax Act, 1961: Sections 2(22)(f), 17(2), 112, 112A, 115QA (applicable to buybacks up to 30/09/2024)
  • Income Tax Rules, 1962: Rule 11UA (CBDT Notification No. 81/2023)
  • Finance (No. 2) Act, 2024: abolition of Section 56(2)(viib) w.e.f. 01/04/2025; buyback deemed dividend regime w.e.f. 01/10/2024; LTCG rate revision w.e.f. 23/07/2024
  • Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008: Sections 24, 64
  • Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999: Section 13
  • Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019
  • Companies (Share Capital and Debentures) Rules, 2014: Form SH-4
  • Companies (Appointment and Qualification of Directors) Rules, 2014: Form DIR-12

External sources:

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